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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Benjamin M. Brennan
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
June 2018
Title: Essays on Nominal GDP Targeting
The subject of this dissertation is nominal GDP (NGDP) targeting. In the
wake of the Great Recession some economists have proposed using some form of
NGDP target to replace current monetary policy. We evaluate the desirability of
NGDP targets based upon their ability to deliver unique and “learnable” equilibria
and their welfare gains in the presence of financial frictions.
In the second chapter we assess the determinacy and E-stability conditions
for simple interest rate rules which respond to NGDP’s deviation from target in a
simple three equation New Keynesian model. The rules under consideration target
either NGDP level or growth, and can either be contemporaneous, one period
ahead, or two periods ahead. We also allow for different types of information sets
for the agents.
In the third chapter we compare welfare loss in consumption equivalent terms
for NGDP targets with more conventional monetary policy in a New Keynesian
model which features financial frictions.
Finally in the fourth chapter we continue our analysis from chapter one
but now allow for strictly positive trend inflation. We present findings for the
relationship between trend inflation and the determinacy and E-stability of the
equilibrium when using interest rate rules that target NGPD.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Nominal GDP (NGDP) targeting has been nominated as an alternate
intermediate target for monetary policy. Some of the reasons for its nomination
are that it weights inflation and output stabilization equally, its desirable zero lower
bound properties, and the countercyclical movements in real debt it creates.
In this dissertation we analyze the desirability of these policies along three
different dimensions. Using a simple two equation New Keynesian model we
examine whether interest rate rules which adjust to deviations from target for
NGDP growth or level will lead to a determinate steady state equilibrium under
rational expectations and whether that rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is
learnable. Then we look at a New Keynesian model which now features financial
frictions and heterogeneous preferences and examine whether welfare is higher
under NGDP based monetary policy or other traditional monetary policies. Finally
we return to the questions of determinacy and E-stability but allow for non-zero
trend inflation and partial indexation to past and/or trend inflation.
In Chapter 2 we look at interest rate feedback rules that respond to
deviations of nominal GDP growth away from the central bank’s targeted value. In
particular we examine the determinacy and E-stability properties of these rules. We
find that these determinacy and E-stability properties vary based upon whether the
rule responds to current or expected NGDP growth. We do find however that an
interest rate rule that responds strictly positively with deviations of current NGDP
level from its target will yield both determinacy and E-stability.
In Chapter 3 we use a New Keynesian model with financial frictions like
the one developed in Curdia and Woodford (2016) and we compare the welfare
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performance of four different NGDP targeting policies with the optimal policy
monetary policy and different traditional policies. We find that most of the NGDP
based policies provide higher welfare than traditional policies.
In Chapter 4 we return to a simple New Keynesian model but now allow
the steady-state gross inflation to not necessarily equal one. We also assume that
prices may not be fully indexed to past or trend inflation. It has been shown that
these assumptions lead to changes in the determinacy and E-stability properties
for a typical Taylor rule. We analyze the determinacy and E-stability properties of
different NGDP targeting policies. We somewhat surprisingly find that it requires
fairly high levels of trend inflation before the determinacy and E-stability properties
of these interest rate rules change.
2
CHAPTER II
NGDP TARGETING, FEEDBACK RULES, DETERMINACY, AND
E-STABILITY
2.1 Introduction
The focus of this paper is the stability both under rational expectations and
adaptive learning of equilibria of models with “Taylor type” interest rate rules
that target nominal GDP (NGDP). For these rules NGDP’s growth rate or level
is the variable the interest rate responds to rather than having separate response
parameters for inflation and the output gap.
There is evidence to suggest that targeting NGDP has some desirable
qualities (Hall and Mankiw, 1994; Taylor, 1985; McCallum and Nelson, 1999a).
Part of the appeal is having one metric indicating how close a central bank is to
its goals, rather than having separate measures linked to employment and prices.
By the quantity theory of money, provided the velocity of money is exogenous,
NGDP is determined directly by the money supply. As a result NGDP ends
up being a natural candidate for an intermediate target for the central bank to
pursue. Furthermore its movements are correlated with the outcome variables that
central banks are typically most concerned with, such as the dual mandate of price
stability and full employment in the United States. With nominal GDP as the
intermediate target when real output falls pushing nominal output below target,
there isn’t a separate inflation target to worry about that ties policymakers hands
when trying to respond to the fall in real output.
For nominal GDP level targeting there are advantages that come with the
history dependence of levels targeting. When shocks cause the economy to miss
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target, policymakers make up for it. Woodford (2012) points out that this feature
along with other features make it similar to the optimal policy at the zero lower
bound from Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
From a practical policy perspective nominal GDP targeting has drawn the
interest of actual policy-makers as well. Writing about the issue of the long-term
downward trend in the natural rate of interest Williams (2016) discusses the
advantages of nominal GDP targeting as a policy alternative when the natural rate
of interest is very close to zero.
Another advocate for the policy, Sumner (2012), offers the following as
practical anecdote in favor:
When Bernanke calls for higher inflation, he means a higher level of
aggregate demand, which economic theory suggests should raise both
the inflation rate and (in the short run) the real incomes of Americans.
In contrast, when average Americans hear the term higher inflation,
they think in terms of a reduction in aggregate supply (perhaps higher
food and energy prices), which reduces the real incomes of average
Americans.
The moral of the story is that the public at large may not understand what
inflation is, particularly the “inflation” that central banks target. Nominal GDP
however is an easy target for the public to understand, thus making nominal GDP
a good candidate for a nominal anchor because it won’t lead to outside pressure
to engage in contractionary policy when real output is low while inflation is above
target.
This paper looks at two general types of feedback rules in a New Keynesian
framework and assesses the uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium in the
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model, also known as determinacy, and whether the equilibrium is expectationally-
stable (E-stable), meaning that agents in this economy could learn the structural
relationships between variables in the rational expectations equilibrium (REE).
Uniqueness is of concern because indeterminacy of the steady state implies that
equilibria not determined by fundamentals of the model, sunspot equilibria, may
arise when the interest rate rules are implemented in the model. The learnability of
the REE is important because rational expectations supposes that agents always
know the structural characteristics of the economy in the model as well as the
distribution of the exogenous shocks. An assumption closer to reality would be
that agents don’t know those structural parameters with certainty but they are
estimating the relationships between endogenous and exogenous variables like an
econometrician might. We want to know whether the REE associated with a simple
linearized New Keynesian model and the class of rules we look at results in E-stable
rational expectations equilibria or if the degree to which the central bank responds
to deviations in nominal GDP growth affects the E-stability of the REE. The
two types of interest rate rules under consideration are ones which target either
the growth or level of nominal GDP. We consider various timing and information
assumptions as well.
Using feedback rules is in contrast to a lot of the nominal GDP targeting
literature Mitra (2003); Gar´ın et al. (2016); Sheedy (2014); McCallum (2015);
Honkapohja and Mitra (2014) which assumes that interest rates are set so as to
precisely achieve a targeted level or growth rate of nominal GDP. This assumption
however may grant too much knowledge of the structural parameters of the
economy to the central bank. Actual central bank behavior in pursuing nominal
GDP targeting as a policy goal may be better approximated by a rule of thumb for
adjusting the policy instrument based upon the growth rate of nominal GDP. When
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nominal GDP grows above its target, the rule increases the interest rate which in
this model decreases the output gap and simultaneously decreases inflation, which
will push growth rate towards the targeted value of nominal GDP.
For these types of rules we have reason to doubt that they will always result
in determinate and E-Stable equilibria because there are determinacy and E-
stability conditions on parameters of the Taylor rule and model parameters that
arise from more standard Taylor rules in New Keynesian models as demonstrated
by Bullard and Mitra (2002).
Our biggest results are: i.) When targeting current NGDP growth, regardless
of information assumptions, a response of greater than one for one to deviations
of NGDP growth from its target ensures both determinacy and E-stability. ii.)
When targeting current NGDP level regardless of information assumptions, any
strictly positive response to deviations from target will result in both determinacy
and E-stability. iii.) We find analytic results for determinacy and E-stability
conditions for the one period ahead expected NGDP growth interest rate rule.
These results indicate that certain parameterizations can trigger what is called
”inverted aggregate demand logic” by Bilbiie (2008), a situation where the response
of output to the real interest rate becomes positive.
In Section 2 we provide an overview of the literature concerning Nominal
GDP targeting in general and then learning and monetary policy with a specific
focus on learning and nominal GDP targeting. In Section 3 we layout the model
and define the different interest rate rules. In Section 4 we present the determinacy
and E-stability results associated with these rules under the different information
assumptions.
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2.2 Literature Review
We build on two different strands of literature - measuring the desirability of
nominal GDP targeting and evaluating monetary policy in the context of learning.
Nominal GDP Targeting
Hall and Mankiw (1994) provides justification for nominal GDP targeting
based upon four criteria for monetary policy rules that they set out - efficiency,
simplicity, precision, and accountability. They argue that nominal GDP targeting
as a policy rule hits all four of these desirability criteria. Hall and Mankiw point
out that it is a policy that can supported by both the Real Business Cycle and
New Keynesian schools of thought because in an RBC framework nominal GDP
targeting will lead to price stability and in an NK framework nominal GDP
targeting is a compromise on the response to a shock to the price level, reducing
output by the amount the price level increased rather than contracting output until
the price level goes back to target.
The authors assume a central bank capable of setting the interest rate to
hit its target either perfectly or with white noise error. They discuss the merits
of targeting levels vs growth rates. They look at three types of targeting rules -
growth-rate targeting, level targeting, and hybrid targeting - which says to keep the
growth of nominal income as close to constant plus whatever percentage gap there
is between real income and its equilibrium level.
While considering how to best implement the policies they make an analogy
that nominal income’s response to a central bank’s purchases of securities is closer
to that of steering a ship than that of steering an automobile. The Fed’s ability
to influence forecasts can help make nominal income growth more responsive to
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current policy. Operating through consensus forecasts also allows nominal GDP
targeting to be an accountable rule. While the Federal Reserve has never adopted
explicitly nominal GDP targeting as a policy the authors find evidence in the data
that the Federal Reserve may have adopted a hybrid type nominal GDP growth
targeting policy in the 1970’s and then growth rate targeting in the 1980’s.
Finally Hall and Mankiw run simulations of a Phillips Curve with shocks
meant to fit macroeconomic history from 1972-1991 where they allow for the three
proposed nominal income targeting rules. They find that the volatility of the price
level itself would have been much lower under any of the nominal income targeting
rules. They find that level targeting performs the best in reducing volatility of the
price level. The results are mixed and depend upon which target is chosen for the
effect on inflation and output growth.
In McCallum and Nelson (1999a) the authors examine the merits of monetary
policy targets of nominal GDP rather than the monetary aggregate or an inflation
index. They first provide evidence that the Federal Reserve is actually engaged
in nominal GDP targeting already by comparing the results of a regression of
the federal funds rate on expected inflation and other variables to the results of
regressing the federal funds rate on different forecasts of nominal GDP growth.
They find that the goodness of fit improves as well as the precision of the
coefficients on other variables in the regression when inflation is replaced with a
measure of nominal GDP growth.
The authors examine the desirability of nominal income targeting in an
open economy model with habit persistence and costly adjustment of prices and
output by firms. The nominal income targeting rule that the authors impose on
this system is a hybrid type rule in that it targets the growth of nominal GDP as
well as the real output gap and it also has a lag of the interest rate in it to capture
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interest rate smoothing. They find that the interest rate rule that targets nominal
GDP leads to less volatility of inflation, output gap, nominal GDP growth, and
interest rates than a traditional Taylor rule that responds to inflation.
Jensen (2002) compares the desirability of nominal GDP growth targeting
with pure discretion and inflation targeting using the socially optimal policy as
a benchmark. The policies considered are derived by minimizing loss functions
with varying weights on inflation, the output gap, and nominal GDP growth. The
desirability is weighted based upon performance in a social welfare function of the
different policies in a standard linearized New Keynesian model.
Jensen finds that under the optimal targeting regimes when the economy
is hit with technology shocks inflation targeting performs better - this is because
under nominal income growth targeting a complete stabilization of the output
gap leads to higher nominal income growth, and thus it leads to an inefficiency
in responding to technology shocks from society’s point of view. On the other hand
when society is hit with cost-push shocks inflation targeting leads to inefficient
outcomes while nominal income targeting is preferable.
More recently Billi (2013) examined the performance of nominal GDP level
targeting in a New Keynesian model with the zero lower bound (ZLB). Nominal
GDP level targeting is achieved by the central bank setting interest rates such
that the squared deviations of the nominal GDP gap (the log price level plus the
log output gap) from the targeted value for the nominal GDP gap is minimized.
The author found that this policy performed better at exiting a ZLB episode than
inflation targeting and also found that nominal GDP targeting is preferable in
terms of welfare relative to inflation targeting. They were able to get a simple
Taylor type rule with smoothing to produce similar results as the nominal GDP
targeting rule.
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Gar´ın et al. (2015) looks at how well nominal GDP level targeting performs
in a New Keynesian set-up that does not have the ”divine coincidence”. The
authors use both a basic New Keynesian model with wage and price stickiness,
and a medium-scale New Keynesian model that also includes capital and capital
utilization costs, habit persistence, and investment adjustment costs. The authors
assume that the central bank sets the interest rate to keep nominal GDP at
target at all times. The authors report welfare deviations from the flexible price
equilibrium and find that nominal GDP targeting consistently performs almost
as well as output gap targeting, and performs better than inflation targeting or a
Taylor rule. They also look at the case where the output gap is observed with noise
and examine the degree of noise necessary for nominal GDP targeting to be just
as good as output gap targeting in terms of welfare losses and find that it is fairly
small - less than .66 percent standard deviation for any degree of persistence in the
error that the output gap is observed.
Of interest to this paper is that nominal GDP level targeting is always
determinate. This result can be compared with our results from Section 4.1 that
the interest rate rule is determinate when the central bank responds more than one
for one to deviations in nominal GDP from target. As Gar´ın et al. (2015) note - a
targeting regime that perfectly hits its target is equivalent to setting the coefficient
on that targeted variable in an interest rate rule equal to infinity, which would be a
special case of our results.
In Koenig (2012) the author examines the relationship between a monetary
policy always adjusts to hit a nominal GDP level target and a Taylor rule in terms
of achieving long-run stability of output and price expectations and argues that
both fit the requirements for “flexible inflation targeting”, ie holding inflation
targets steady for the long term but being afforded discretion to respond to short-
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run deviations in output. The key difference between the two policies is that under
nominal GDP targeting the central bank will consider a longer history of price
levels rather than just the current period’s.
In a somewhat different context Sheedy (2014) examines nominal GDP
targeting’s effect on financial markets. In an overlapping generations model with
debt and incomplete markets the author explores the welfare implications of
different monetary policy rules. The author finds that a policy that perfectly
hits its nominal GDP target can be used to “complete the market” by removing
uncertainty about future nominal income that fall on the borrower. It is also shown
that in the author’s model inflation targeting is associated with greater volatility in
the financial markets than nominal GDP targeting. Inflation targeting is actually
pro-cyclical - credit is too freely available during expansions and it is too tight in
recessions.
In McCallum (2015) the author looks at optimal monetary policy in a
standard small-scale New Keynesian model. Nominal GDP targeting is achieved
by minimizing a loss function. The author shows that one can rearrange the first
order condition associated with a nominal GDP growth targeting policy to be
nearly equivalent to the timeless perspective optimal monetary policy, policy that
behaves the same way as the optimal policy under commitment but assuming that
commitment had been adopted in the distant past.
Ball (1999) demonstrates that a nominal GDP targeting rule that targets
either the level or that growth rate of nominal GDP perfectly will lead to non-
stationarity in a purely backward-looking New Keynesian model. Ball looks at
optimal monetary policy rules - monetary policy rules that minimize the variance
of output and inflation. They define an efficient rule as a rule that achieves the
minimized variance of output and inflation for some set of weights. In a closed
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economy model with backward-looking IS and Phillips curve relations, the author
demonstrates that nominal GDP targeting is an inefficient and even unstable policy
in that it leads to an unbounded variance of both output and inflation due to the
system displaying unit roots in its eigenvalues.
Yet McCallum (1997) demonstrates that with forward-looking inflation
expectations, which is something more in line with the standard New Keynesian
literature, the instability that Ball found is overturned. He demonstrates that Ball’s
result is unique to Ball’s specification using a backward-looking Phillips Curve,
independent of the behavior of aggregate demand, and not a problem for nominal
GDP targeting as a policy.
Learning and Monetary Policy
The first example where nominal GDP targeting is examined in the context
of learning is in Mitra (2003). In a standard New Keynesian model with a central
bank that pursues an interest rate policy that will reach its nominal GDP growth
target every period he examines the determinacy of the steady state and the E-
stability of the rational expectations equilibrium. This interest rate is found by
setting nominal GDP growth equal to its target and then plugging in the IS and
NKPC relations and solving for the nominal interest rate. He finds that the model’s
steady-state is determinate and the REE exhibits E-Stability. Mitra also finds that
this is no longer true when the central bank assumes the agents in the economy
make forecasts using rational expectations. Finally Mitra finds that when the
central bank targets the expected nominal GDP growth the model becomes E-
Unstable.
More recently Honkapohja and Mitra (2014) have compared the stability
and expectational dynamics of inflation targeting, price level targeting, and a
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Wicksellian interest rate rule that targets the level of nominal GDP. They use
a New Keynesian set-up and assume that agents learn the steady-state values
of output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate. They find that there is
indeterminacy under the nominal GDP targeting interest rate rule if the rule
responds to deviations from its target by more than the inverse of the discount
rate times one plus the steady-state inflation rate. They examine the expectational
stability of the steady state and find that for both rules the zero lower bound
equilibrium is expectationally unstable. They also compare the characteristics of
the expectational dynamics when the economy is away from the steady state. They
find that inflation targeting converges to the steady state faster than price level
or nominal GDP level targeting, but they find that nominal GDP level targeting
reduces volatility of inflation and interest rates better than the other interest rate
rules. Nominal GDP targeting is also shown to be second best to inflation targeting
in minimizing output volatility. They also look at the expectational dynamics
where agents have guidance about the policy rule when forming expectations, they
find that guidance does speed up convergence for price level and nominal GDP level
targeting, and improves the robustness of convergence as well.
This paper is also related to the broader literature on learning and monetary
policy. Evans et al. (2008) examines the efficacy of monetary and fiscal policy in
a New Keynesian model when the economy is trapped in a deflationary spiral or
liquidity trap due to pessimistic shocks to expectations. They find that aggressive
monetary policy alone is not enough to ensure that the economy does not enter a
deflationary spiral. A combination of aggressive monetary policy and fiscal policy
does however eliminate the risk of deflationary spirals by keeping inflation above
some minimum threshold.
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Bullard and Mitra (2002) examines the stability under learning of various
Taylor-type rules. They view stability under learning as one condition for
desirability of monetary policy and a more realistic measure than the determinacy
of rational expectations equilibria. The authors look at four variants of the rules,
rules that respond to contemporaneous output and inflation data, rules that
respond to lagged output and inflation data, rules that respond to forecasts of
future inflation and output, and rules that respond to expectations of current
inflation and output. Under both contemporaneous data and contemporaneous
expectations the authors find that the conditions for determinacy and E-Stability
are the same, and similar to the Taylor principle. Under lagged data there can be
situations where the system is determinate but E-Unstable. Under the rule that
reacts to expectations of future output and inflation there can be regions that are
E-Stable but not determinate.
Preston (2005) looks at the stability under learning of various interest rate
policies when agents make decisions based on infinite horizon forecasts. The author
argues that long horizon forecasts are more appropriate because agents are not
able to make decisions based on the knowledge of the behavior of other agents in
the economy like they would under rational expectations. As a result the model
generates different predictions of the behavior of aggregate variables than under
rational expectations. The interest rate rules considered are a nominal interest rate
rule that depends on past exogenous disturbances, and a Taylor rule that responds
to the model’s endogenous variables. The author demonstrates that the former of
the two rules is E-Unstable while the latter is E-Stable so long as it satisfies the
Taylor principle.
Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) provides a survey of the general stability
properties of various types of monetary policies under various information
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assumptions. Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) look at the E-Stability of the optimal
monetary policy rule under rational expectations and find that it is E-Unstable, but
incorporating private agent’s forecasts into the optimal policy rule overturns this.
This paper builds on these lines of research by investigating the determinacy
of the steady state and E-stability of the REE in a New Keynesian model with
nominal GDP growth rate feedback rules, which does not attribute a deep
knowledge of the economy to the central bank.
This paper contributes both to the literature on nominal GDP growth and
learning and monetary policy. We present both numerical results and parameter
restrictions for the interest rate feedback rules that target nominal GDP growth
that will ensure determinacy of the steady state and E-stability of the REE in a
New Keynesian model. These rules react to deviations in either contemporaneous
or expected nominal GDP growth from the growth of the flexible price level of real
GDP.
2.3 Model
Consider the linearized New Keynesian model used in Clarida et al. (1999),
which is derived from the behavior of utility-maximizing households and profit-
maximizing firms in the Appendix:
xt = −φ(ˆit − E∗t pit+1) + E∗t xt+1 + gt (2.1)
pit = λxt + βE
∗
t pit+1 + ut. (2.2)
Here xt is the output gap, pit is inflation, iˆt is the deviation from steady state
of the nominal interest rate and E∗t xt+1 and E
∗
t pit+1 represent the private-sector
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expectations of the output gap and inflation in period t + 1. These expectations
need not be rational expectations (RE). The model parameter φ ≥ 0 is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption, which is equal to 1/σ where
σ is the representative household’s CRRA utility parameter. β ∈ (0, 1) is the
representative household’s discount factor. Finally, λ ≥ 0 is the slope of the New
Keynesian Phillips curve, which is a function of the steady-state level of markup on
goods by the firms, the degree of price stickiness, the output elasticity of labor of
the common production function, the household’s CRRA utility parameter, and the
household’s disutility of labor parameter.
In most of the literature nominal GDP targeting is achieved by setting
interest rates or money supply equal to the value that achieves the level or
growth-rate target. This, however, requires the central bank to have knowledge
of structural parameters to set the interest rate. We model the central bank as
wanting to target nominal GDP growth by simply choosing to raise interest rates
when nominal GDP growth is above the target growth rate and lowering interest
rates when it is below the target growth rate. This is in contrast to Honkapohja
and Mitra (2014) which has a rule that adjusts rates based upon levels of nominal
GDP, Sheedy (2014) features an interest rate rule that responds to deviations in
nominal GDP from target as well as changes in debt levels and the growth rate of
real GDP, and McCallum and Nelson (1999a) which has the interest rate respond
to nominal GDP growth with no target and the output gap separately, and a
smoothing term.
A rule targeting nominal GDP growth could be thought of as a feedback
rule similar in form to a Taylor rule. The central bank can choose how much it
responds to deviations from the target. The central bank could choose to target
a constant growth rate, but this does not take into account structural changes in
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the economy which may cause potential GDP growth to be either greater or less
than a constant target, so a central bank targeting nominal GDP growth would
likely choose a “moving target” where the target changes based upon changes in
what we call “potential” nominal GDP growth which is the growth in the “natural
level” of real output plus trend inflation which is set to zero for this paper. We will
consider rules that target both current and expected growth. We will also evaluate
the E-Stability of the REE of the model with each of those rules under different
information assumptions.
The rest of this section presents the form of these rules. The following section
will present the determinacy and E-stability results associated with these rules.
Nominal GDP Growth Rules
The NGDP rules under consideration can be boiled down to:
iˆt = αE
∗
t (pit+i + xt+i − xt+i−1), (2.3)
where i can take on the values {0, 1, 2} representing rules that resound to
current and future NGDP growth. This rule says the central bank will raise interest
rates when the growth rate of nominal GDP, pit+i + yt+i − yt+i−1, is above the
growth rate of the natural level of real output plus its target for inflation. Because
we assume zero trend inflation we also assume that the central bank targets an
inflation rate of zero.
For E-stability we will consider both case where the information set at time
t contains all current variables and the case where the information set at time t
contains time t exogenous variables (gt and ut) and t− 1 endogenous variables (xt−1
and pit−1).
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Nominal GDP Level Rules
We also consider the case where the central bank is targeting the level of
NGDP:
it = αE
∗
t (pt+i + xt+i), (2.4)
where pt is the log price level and as with (2.3) i takes on the values of
{0, 1, 2}. This rule tells the central bank to raise interest rates when the level of
nominal GDP, pt+i + yt+i, rises above the natural level of real output where we have
assumed that the central bank targets of price level of one.
We will analyze both information set assumptions as with the growth based
rule from before.
As mentioned earlier, the majority of the rest of the literature with similar
rules does not adjust rates based on the deviations from the natural level or has a
generic target. The closest analog for our target is Mitra (2003). He implements
nominal GDP growth targeting assuming that the central bank knows the
structural relationships in the economy and assuming that interest rates are set
by assuming that nominal GDP growth is equal to target. Mitra’s targeting policy
sets the growth of nominal GDP equal to the growth in real potential output.
2.4 Results
For macroeconomic models with rational expectations, there is a concern
about the existence of multiple equilibrium paths, known as indeterminacy.
Depending on the parameters of the model it may be the case that at any point
in time any value of a free variable (xt and pit here) can be shown to be part of an
equilibrium path to the steady state. In order to establish the uniqueness of the
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Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) of this system we put each system in the
form:
yt = AEtyt+1 +Bvt. (2.5)
For determinacy the eigenvalues of A that are inside the unit circle must be
equal to the number of free variables and the number of eigenvalues of A that are
outside the unit circle must be equal to the number of predetermined variables.
For E-stability rather than rational expectations we assume that agents
are boundedly rational, in particular, that the agents use data generated by
the economy described in the model to use recursive least squares to form their
forecasts of future variables. We assume that agents use forecast rules that are of
the same form as the minimum state variable (MSV) solution. We will describe the
conditions for E-stability of the REEs in each of the subsections as they vary across
the timing of the rules and the information assumptions used.
Current Nominal GDP Growth Rule
When the rule described in (2.3) with i = 0 is used yt = (xt, pit, xt−1)
′
and
A =

0 0 1
0 β λ
− 1
αφ
− 1
α
+ β 1+αφ+αλφ
αφ
 . (2.6)
For determinacy to hold the number of eigenvalues of A inside the unit circle
must be equal to the number of free variables. Because there is one pre-determined
variable, xt−1 and two free variables, xt and pit, for uniqueness of the REE two of
the eigenvalues of A need to be inside the unit circle and one eigenvalue needs to
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be outside of the unit circle. The analytic form of the eigenvalues of this matrix are
quite complex, and analytic conditions for determinacy do not appear possible to
obtain.
Notice that the rule is a special case of the optimal rule derived in McCallum
and Nelson (2000) although only when α > 1 for the above rule and for specific
values of θ, ω, and κ and the AR coefficient on the lagged interest rate set to zero:
iˆt = pit + θ(pit + (ω/κ)(xt − xt−1)) (2.7)
where ω is the relative weight placed on output variance in the central bank’s
objective function, κ is the slope of the Phillips curve when the NKPC is written
in terms of yt rather than xt, and θ in a similar role as α in our model.
While McCallum and Nelson (2000) did not report results on determinacy of
this rule, Evans and Honkapohja (2006) finds that numerically all parameter values
of κ and θ appeared to be determinate under the calibrations used. The results we
obtain with (2.3) with i = 0 when using the same calibrations: Clarida et al. (2000)
- β = .99, φ = 1, and λ = .3; Woodford (1999) - β = .99, φ = 6.11, and λ = .024;
McCallum and Nelson (1999b) - β = .99, φ = .164, and λ = .3 are consistent with
the findings of Evans and Honkapohja (2006).
We conjecture that the REE is not unique when α < 1 and is unique when
α > 1. This holds true in all three model calibrations, which is in line with the
findings related to the optimal rule from McCallum and Nelson (2000) in Evans
and Honkapohja (2006).
For E-stability, following Honkapohja and Evans (2003) the reduced form of
our model can be written as:
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yt = ME
∗
t yt+1 +Nyt−1 + Pvt. (2.8)
We assume that agents use forecast rules that are of the same form as the
minimum state variable (MSV) solution which takes the following form:
yt = a+ byt−1 + cvt. (2.9)
We also assume that the agents forecast future variables based upon
a perceived law of motion (PLM) in the same form as the MSV solution.
Additionally we assume that their information set is (1, yt, vt), therefore they form
expectations:
E∗t yt+1 = at + btyt + ctFvt (2.10)
where F is a diagonal matrix with the AR parameters for the two shocks along the
diagonal which are set to .9 each following Mitra (2003). We assume that F is part
of the agents information set.
Agents update their estimates of (a, b, c) every period using the following
algorithm:
ζt = ζt−1 + t−1R−1t et−1ς
′
t
Rt = Rt−1 + t−1(et−1e
′
t−1 −Rt−1)
where ζ
′
t = (at, bt, ct), e
′
t = (1, y
′
t−1, v
′
t), and ςt = yt−1 − ζ ′t−1et−1. We are now
concerned with whether the above stochastic recursive algorithm will converge
to the REE. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) shows that the above algorithm will
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converge to the REE values if the REE is expectationally stable or E-stable, this
is called the E-stability principal. What this means is that with a rule meant to
revise parameters any perturbations away from the REE will return to the REE. To
obtain the E-stability conditions first we’ll plug equation (2.10) into (2.8) in order
to obtain the actual law of motion (ALM):
yt = (I −Mb)−1Ma+ (I −Mb)−1Nyt−1 + (I −Mb)−1(McF + P )vt. (2.11)
We can see in the above equation that there is a mapping of the PLM into
the ALM, this map is:
T (a, b, c) = ((I −Mb)−1Ma, (I −Mb)−1N, (I −Mb)−1(McF + P )). (2.12)
The E-Stability of this system is governed by the following differential
equation:
d
dτ
(a, b, c) = T (a, b, c)− (a, b, c). (2.13)
Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001) in models of the form expressed
above E-stability depends upon the eigenvalues of the following:
DTa(a¯, b¯) = (I −Mb¯)−1M (2.14)
DTb(b¯) = [(I −Mb¯)−1N ]⊗ [(I −Mb¯)−1M ] (2.15)
DTc(b¯, c¯) = F
′ ⊗ [(I −Mβ¯)−1M ]. (2.16)
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With information set (y
′
t, v
′
t, 1) a necessary condition for E-stability is that the
eigenvalues of DTa, DTb, and DTc have real parts less than 1.
To assess E-Stability we will have to find b¯ from the MSV solution. It can be
shown that b¯ solves the matrix quadratic:
Mb2 − b+N = 0 (2.17)
We use the methods from Mccallum (2011) to find the MSV solution for
models of this form. The above matrix quadratic can be written as:
M 0
0 I

b2
b
 =
I −N
I 0

b
I
 . (2.18)
Taking the generalized Schur decomposition of the first matrix on each side of
the equation referred to as A and B respectively, we have that there is a Q, Z, S,
and T such that QA = SZ and QB = TZ. Pre-multiplying both sides of the above
equation by Q it will then be:
S1,1 0
S2,1 S2,2

Z1,1 Z1,2
Z2,1 Z2,2

b2
b
 =
T1,1 0
T2,1 T2,2

Z1,1 Z1,2
Z2,1 Z2,2

b
I
 . (2.19)
The first row is S11(Z11b + Z12)b = T11(Z11b + Z12), giving b = −Z−111 Z12. The
diagonal elements of S and T together (s11/t11) form the generalized eigenvalues
of the matrix pencil (A − λB). When solving for b, we need to make sure that the
generalized eigenvalues are ordered such that b→ 0 as N → 0.
As with determinacy, we could not obtain analytic results for E-Stability. The
graphs of the regions of determinacy and E-Stability in Figure 1 possess interesting
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features. All figures fix β = .99, and in figure (1a) we fix λ = .3, meaning that at
φ = 1 we get the results for the (Clarida et al., 2000) and at φ = .164 we get the
results for McCallum and Nelson (1999b). We find that with a fixed λ and a free φ
whenever α > 1 the steady state is determinate and most of the determinate region
is E-Stable although there is a sliver that is E-Unstable and determinate near α
equal to one. In figure (1b) when we instead fix φ = .164 and examine determinacy
over α and λ, we find again that determinacy and E-stability occur when α > 1
and also note that because φ is sufficiently low there is no region that is E-Stable
and indeterminate. Note that λ = .3 in figure (1b) corresponds to the results for
McCallum and Nelson (1999b). Finally in (1c) we fix φ = 6.11 as in Woodford
(1999) to make sure that the results do not flip based upon whether φ is greater or
less than 1, notice that the results here are what we would expect based upon those
in figure (1a), the steady state is determinate and E-stable, a wedge of E-instability
and determinacy near α = 1, and a section of E-Stability and indeterminacy when
α < 1.
For context of these determinacy and E-Stability results, Mitra (2003)
examines a rule that targets current period nominal GDP perfectly every period.
He finds that the rule is always determinate and E-stable. For the rule considered
here, determinacy depends upon the intensity of response to deviations from target
and E-stability varies with the parameters and the intensity of response. Our
results are similar to those found in Evans and Honkapohja (2006) for an interest
rate rule based on the timeless perspective optimal monetary policy.
It is common to assume that the information set at time t is (1, yt−1, vt).
This assumption does not change the determinacy property nor the MSV solution.
When this is assumed the interest rate rule now looks like:
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Determinacy and E-Stability of Contemporaneous NGDP Growth
Feedback Rule
(a) β = .99 and λ = .3 (b) beta = .99 and φ = 0.164
(c) β = .99 and φ = 6.11
FIGURE 1. All three figures show the regions of determinacy and E-stability over
different regions of the parameter space. In all figures β = .99. In figure (a) λ is
fixed at .3. In figure (b) φ is fixed at 0.164. In figure φ is fixed at 6.11.
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iˆt = α(E
∗
t pit + E
∗
t xt − xt−1).
The system can be written as:
yt = KE
∗
t yt +ME
∗
t yt+1 +Nyt−1 + Pvt. (2.20)
Using a PLM based upon the form of the MSV solution the agents forecast
future variables:
E∗t yt+1 = at + bt(at + btyt−1 + ctvt) + ctFvt (2.21)
E∗t yt = at + btyt−1 + ctvt. (2.22)
Agents update their estimates of (a, b, c) every period using the following
algorithm:
ζt = ζt−1 + t−1R−1t et−1ς
′
t
Rt = Rt−1 + t−1(et−1e
′
t−1 −Rt−1)
Where ζ
′
t = (at, bt, ct), e
′
t = (1, y
′
t−1, v
′
t), and ςt = yt−1 − ζ ′t−1et−1. As before
the E-stability principal guarantees that this algorithm will converge to the REE
over time. To obtain the E-stability conditions first we’ll plug equations (2.21) and
(2.22) into (2.20) in order to obtain the ALM:
yt = (K +M(I + b))a+ (N +Kb+Mb
2)yt−1 + (Kc+Mbc+McF + P )vt. (2.23)
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We can see in the above equation that there is a mapping of the PLM into
the ALM, this map is:
T (a, b, c) = ((K +M(I + b))a,N +Kb+Mb2, Kc+Mbc+McF + P ). (2.24)
The E-Stability of this system is governed by the following differential
equation:
d
dτ
(a, b, c) = T (a, b, c)− (a, b, c). (2.25)
Following Evans and Honkapohja (2006) in models of the form expressed
above E-stability depends upon the eigenvalues of the following:
DTa(a¯, b¯) = K +M(I + b) (2.26)
DTb(b¯) = b¯
′ ⊗M + I ⊗Mb¯+ I ⊗K (2.27)
DTc(b¯, c¯) = F
′ ⊗M + I ⊗Mb¯+ I ⊗K. (2.28)
With information set (1, y
′
t−1, v
′
t) a necessary condition for E-stability is that
the eigenvalues of DTa, DTb, and DTc have real parts less than 1.
Figure (2) is organized in a similar manner to figure (1). As is apparent there
is not a large difference between the regions of determinacy and E-stability for
either information set, however there is now a small set of values of the parameters
that are E-stable and indeterminate in figure (2a) and (2c) implying stable
sunspots.
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Determinacy and E-Stability of Contemporaneous NGDP Growth
Feedback Rule - Alternative Information
(a) β = .99 and λ = .3 (b) beta = .99 and φ = 0.164
(c) β = .99 and φ = 6.11
FIGURE 2. All three figures show the regions of determinacy and E-stability over
different regions of the parameter space. In all figures β = .99. In figure (a) λ is
fixed at .3. In figure (b) φ is fixed at 0.164. In figure φ is fixed at 6.11.
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Expected Nominal GDP Growth Rule
When the rule described in (2.3) is used with i = 1 and yt = (xt, pit)
′
then:
A =
1 −θ
λ λθ + β
 (2.29)
θ =
φ(1− α)
1− φα
If the eigenvalues of A are both inside the unit circle then the model is
determinate. Some useful values of α for determinacy and E-stability are:
α˜ =
2 + 2β + λφ
φ(2 + 2β + λ)
α∗+ =
1 + 2
√
β + β + λφ
φ(1 + 2
√
β + β + λ)
α∗− =
1− 2√β + β + λφ
φ(1− 2√β + β + λ)
Proposition 2.4.1
For φ > 1 both eigenvalues of A are inside the unit circle if α ∈ (α˜, 1),
for φ < 1 both the eigenvalues of A are inside the unit circle if α ∈
(1, α˜).
Proof The eigenvalues of A are:
f(α) =
(1 + β)(αφ− 1) + λφ(α− 1) +√−4β(−1 + αφ)2 + ((1 + β)(1− αφ) + λφ(1− α))2)
2(αφ− 1)
g(α) =
(1 + β)(αφ− 1) + λφ(α− 1)−√−4β(−1 + αφ)2 + ((1 + β)(1− αφ) + λφ(1− α))2)
2(αφ− 1)
29
For φ > 1 it can be verified that f(1) = 1 and g(1) = β. For φ < 1 it can be verified
that f(1) = β and g(1) = 1. If φ > 1 then α˜ < 1 and if φ < 1 then α˜ > 1. For φ > 1
we have f(α˜) = −β and g(α˜) = −1. If φ < 1 then f(α˜) = −1 and g(α˜) = −β.
For φ > 1 we have α∗+ < α
∗
− < 1, and for φ < 1 we have 1 < α
+
− < α
∗
+.
The discriminant of the characteristic polynomial is zero when α = α∗±, thus we can
factor the discriminant into (α − α∗−)(α − α∗+). For φ > 1: f(α∗+) = g(α∗+) = −
√
β
and f(α∗−) = g(α
∗
−) =
√
β. For φ < 1 the opposite. When:
min {α∗−, α∗+} < α < max {α∗−, α∗+}
then the discriminant is negative and the values of f and g are complex. The
modulus of all complex values of f and g equal
√
β. Therefore all values of α that
generate complex eigenvalues will be inside the unit circle.
Now observe that the derivatives of f and g are:
f ′(α) =
λφ(φ− 1)((1 + β)(αφ− 1) + λφ(α− 1) +√((1 + β)(1− αφ) + λφ(1− α))2 − 4β(αφ− 1)2)
2(αφ− 1)2√((1 + β)(1− αφ) + λφ(1− α))2 − 4β(αφ− 1)2
g′(α) =
λφ(φ− 1)((1 + β)(1− αφ) + λφ(1− α) +√((1 + β)(1− αφ) + λφ(1− α))2 − 4β(αφ− 1)2)
2(αφ− 1)2√((1 + β)(1− αφ) + λφ(1− α))2 − 4β(αφ− 1)2
When φ > 1 f ′(α) is greater than 0 when α > α∗−. Because f(α
∗
−) =
√
β, f(1) = 1,
and because f is strictly increasing and continuous on the interval α ∈ (α∗−, 1)
we can conclude that the values of f are inside the unit circle for that interval.
Similarly g′(α) < 0 on that same interval. Because g(α∗+) =
√
β, g(1) = β, and g is
continuous and strictly decreasing on the inverval α ∈ (α∗−, 1) we can conclude that
the values of g are inside the unit circle on that interval.
When φ > 1: f ′(α) < 0 and g′(α) > 0 when α < α∗+ provided α 6= φ−1. We
have f(α∗+) = g(α
∗
+) = −
√
β and we also know that f(α˜) = −β and g(α˜) = −1. As
before because f and g are continuous (it can be verified that φ−1 < α˜ for φ > 1)
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and strictly decreasing and increasing respectively on the interval α ∈ (α˜, α∗+) the
values of f and g must be less than one in absolute value.
For φ < 1 the argument is almost the same. f ′(α) > 0 and g′(α) < 0 when
α < α∗−. Because f(1) = β, g(1) = 1, f(α
∗
−) = g(α
∗
−) =
√
β, f and g are continuous
and strictly increasing and decreasing respectively on the interval α ∈ (1, α∗−) then
the values of f and g must be less than one in absolute value.
When α > α∗+ and φ < 1, f
′(α) < 0 and g′(α) > 0 provided α 6= φ−1.
Because f(α∗+) = g(α
∗
+) = −
√
β, f(α˜) = −1, g(α˜) = −β, f and g are continuous
(it can be verified that α˜ < φ−1 when φ < 1) and strictly decreasing and increasing
respectively over the interval α ∈ (α∗+, α˜) then the values of f and g must be less
than one in absolute value.
For φ = 1 the eigenvalues take on the following values:
1 + β + λ
2
+
√
((1 + β + λ)2 − 4β
2
1 + β + λ
2
−
√
(1 + β + λ)2 − 4β
2
.
the larger of the two is never less than one given the parameter restrictions. A
direct implication is that the calibration from Clarida et al. (2000) will always have
an indeterminate equilibrium with the forward looking rule. To see why look at
figure (3a). As φ → 1 then α˜ → 1 this leads to there being no values of α for which
the eigenvalues of A are inside the unit circle.
Alternatively notice that when φ = 1 is used then (2.1) reduces to:
xt = Etxt+1 + Etpit+1 +
1
1− αgt (2.30)
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Now α’s only impact on the IS equation is on the effects of the exogenous
process gt, it does not have an effect how the output gap responds to expected
inflation and the expected output gap. Finally we can also observe that φ = 1
also implies that θ = 1.
Next we will look at the stability under least squares learning of the system
when the interest rate targets expected nominal GDP growth. The system with this
interest rate rule can be written as:
yt = ME
∗
t yt+1 + Pvt (2.31)
The minimum state variable (MSV) solution takes the following form:
yt = a+ cvt. (2.32)
We assume that the agents forecast future variables based upon a perceived
law of motion (PLM) in the same form as the MSV solution. Additionally we
assume that their information set is (1, yt, vt), therefore they form expectations:
E∗t yt+1 = at + ctFvt. (2.33)
Where F is a diagonal matrix with the AR parameters for the two shocks
along the diagonal which are set to .9 each following Mitra (2003). We assume
that F is part of the agents information set. Agents update their estimates of (a, c)
every period using the following algorithm:
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ζt = ζt−1 + t−1R−1t et−1ς
′
t
Rt = Rt−1 + t−1(et−1e
′
t−1 −Rt−1)
Where ζ
′
t = (at, ct), e
′
t = (1, v
′
t), and ςt = yt−1−ζ ′t−1et−1. We are now concerned
with whether the above stochastic recursive algorithm will converge to the REE. To
obtain the E-stability conditions first we’ll plug equation (2.32) into (2.31) in order
to obtain the actual law of motion (ALM):
yt = Ma+ (McF + P )vt. (2.34)
The mapping of the PLM into the ALM is:
T (a, c) = (Ma,McF + P ). (2.35)
The E-Stability of this system is governed by the following differential
equation:
d
dτ
(a, c) = T (a, c)− (a, c). (2.36)
Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001) in models of the form expressed
above E-stability depends upon the eigenvalues of the following:
DTa(a¯) = M (2.37)
DTc(b¯, c¯) = F
′ ⊗M (2.38)
33
The REE is E-Stable when the eigenvalues of DTa and DTc have real parts
less than 1.
The unique eigenvalues of DTc are the eigenvalues of DTa scaled down by .9
and therefore we only need to concern ourselves with the eigenvalues of DTa for E-
stability. By Proposition 2.4.1 and noting that M is the matrix we referred to as A
in the previous section, we already know that E-Stability holds for α ∈ (α˜, 1) for
φ > 1 and α ∈ (1, α˜) for φ < 1. We also know that the value of α will have no
impact on E-Stability when φ = 1.
Proposition 2.4.2
For φ > 1 the real parts of the eigenvalues of M are less than one for
α ∈ (φ−1, 1), for φ < 1 the real parts of the eigenvalues of M are less
than one for α ∈ (1, φ−1).
Proof By Proposition 4.1 we have that both eigenvalues of M (hereafter referred
to as f and g defined as they were in the proof to Propostion 4.1) are between
negative one and one when α ∈ (α˜, 1) for φ > 1 and α ∈ (1, α˜) for φ < 1. Recall
that if φ > 1 then g is strictly increasing when α < α∗+ except for α = φ
−1. The
limit of g from the left and the right respectively are:
lim
α→ 1
φ
+
(1 + β)(αφ− 1) + λφ−√((1 + β)(1− αφ) + λφ(1− α))2 − 4β(αφ− 1)2
2(αφ− 1) = −∞
lim
α→ 1
φ
−
(1 + β)(αφ− 1) + λφ−√((1 + β)(1− αφ) + λφ(1− α))2 − 4β(αφ− 1)2
2(αφ− 1) =∞
The first limit combined with the fact that g is strictly increasing and
continuous on the interval α ∈ (φ−1, α˜), equal to negative one when α = α˜,
and the results of Proposition 4.1 imply that the real part of g is less than 1 for
α ∈ (φ−1, 1).
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Next observe that:
g(0) =
1 + β + λ+
√
(1 + β + λ)2 − 4β
2
Which is greater than one given our assumptions on β and λ. Because g is
strictly increasing and continuous for α ∈ [0, φ−1] g is greater than one for all values
of α on that interval.
Finally f is strictly decreasing for all values of α < α∗+ except for α = φ
−, and
the limit of f as α → φ−1 is zero by L’Hospital’s rule. As a result the real part of f
is less than 1 for α ∈ (φ−1, 1).
For φ < 1 f is strictly decreasing for α > α∗+ and the limits from the left and
right as it approaches φ−1 are:
lim
α→ 1
φ
+
(1 + β)(αφ− 1) + λφ−√((1 + β)(1− αφ) + λφ(1− α))2 − 4β(αφ− 1)2
2(αφ− 1) =∞
lim
α→ 1
φ
−
(1 + β)(αφ− 1) + λφ−√((1 + β)(1− αφ) + λφ(1− α))2 − 4β(αφ− 1)2
2(αφ− 1) = −∞
The second limit along with f(α˜) = −1, that f is strictly decreasing for
α ∈ [α˜, φ−1) and the results from Proposition 4.1 imply that the real part of f is
less than one for α ∈ (1, φ−1). Together the first limit, that f strictly is decreasing
and continuous for α ∈ (φ−1,∞) and that the limit of f as α→∞ is:
1 + β + λ+
√
(1 + β + λ)2 − 4β
2
Implies that the real part of f is strictly greater than one for α ∈ (φ−1,∞).
Finally observe that g is strictly increasing and continuous for α > α∗+ except
for α = φ−1, g(α˜) = −β, and that by l’Hospital’s rule the limit of g as α → φ−1 is
35
zero. These along with the results from Proposition 4.1 imply that the real part of
g is less than one for α ∈ (1, φ−1).
The results from Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 can be seen in Figure (3). As with
previous figures, (3a) fixes λ = .3 and plots the regions of determinacy and E-
Stability in (α, φ) space. The region of E-Stability is larger than the region of
determinacy which is contained in the E-Stable region (notice the small slivers on
the edges). Comparing with (3b) and (3c) this result is much more pronounced.
Particularly because the boundaries for E-Stability only depend on φ whereas the
boundaries for determinacy depend on β, φ, and λ. This differs from Mitra (2003)
results for a rule that targeted expected nominal GDP growth, where the rule was
always E-unstable.
The flipping of regions of determinacy around φ = 1 is similar to the results
in Bilbiie (2008). The author presents a New Keynesian model with limited asset
market participation in the form of a fixed fraction of households optimizing a
static problem every period and not participating in asset markets. He assumes
the central bank sets interest rates based on a linear combination of expected
inflation and the current output gap. This eventually affects the coefficient on the
real interest rate in the NKIS equation. Specifically, there is a threshold value for
the fraction of households who do not participate in asset markets which causes
the sign on that coefficient changes. The author refers to situations where the real
interest rate has a positive effect on real output as cases of “Inverted Aggregate
Demand Logic” (IADL). Under IADL the Taylor principle becomes inverted
and the equilibrium becomes unique when the central bank responds to inflation
expectations in a passive manner. The coefficient on expected inflation in the IS
equation in their model will equal −δ−1(φpi − 1), where −δ−1 is the coefficient on
the real interest rate and φpi is the response parameter in the central bank’s interest
36
TABLE 1. Inverted Aggregate Demand Logic and Determinacy
φ α Result
< 1 < 1 SADL violates Taylor Principle
< 1 (1, φ−1) SADL satisfies Taylor Principle
< 1 > φ−1 IADL and violates Inverted Taylor Principle
> 1 > 1 IADL and violates Inverted Taylor Principle
> 1 (φ−1, 1) IADL and satisfies the Inverted Taylor Principle
> 1 < φ−1 SADL violates Taylor Principle
rate rule. An active response (φpi > 1) under IADL δ < 0 will result in a positive
response for real output. This, in turn, leads to an increase in inflation today and
the non-fundamental shock to inflation expectations becomes self-fulfilling. Instead,
a passive response (φpi < 1) is needed to ensure that inflation expectations do not
become self-fulfilling.
To see how this relates to our results plus (2.3) for i = 1 into the IS relation
and solve for xt. In this case, we get:
xt = E
∗
t xt+1 −
φ(α− 1)
1− φα E
∗
t pit+1 + gt (2.39)
We can look case by case for when IADL shows up and whether that case results in
a determinate equilibrium or not. We see that the determinacy results found in this
section are in line with the results found for models that exhibit IADL.
As before we want to investigate how the results compare when we assume
that the information set only includes lagged endogenous variables. With this new
assumption the forward looking interest rate rule becomes:
iˆt = α(E
∗
t pit+1 + E
∗
t xt+1 − E∗t xt) (2.40)
Substituting (2.40) into (2.1):
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Determinacy and E-Stability of Expected NGDP Growth Feedback Rule
(a) β = .99 and λ = .3 (b) β = .99 and φ = 0.164
(c) β = .99 and φ = 6.11
FIGURE 3. All three figures show the regions of determinacy and E-stability over
sections of the parameter space. In all figures β = .99. In figure (a) λ is fixed at .3.
In figure (b) φ is fixed at 0.164. In figure φ is fixed at 6.11.
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xt = −φ(α− 1)E∗t pit+1 + (1− φα)E∗t xt+1 + φαE∗t xt + gt (2.41)
This equation along with equation (2.2) can be rewritten in matrix form as:
yt = KE
∗
t yt +ME
∗
t yt+1 + Pvt (2.42)
The MSV solution and PLM are the same as in the previous section. The
ALM however is now:
yt = (K +M)a+ (McF +Kc+ P )vt (2.43)
This means the mapping from PLM to ALM is:
T (a, c) = (Ma+Ka,McF +Kc) (2.44)
The stability is governed by the differential equation:
d
dτ
(a, c) = T (a, c)− (a, c) (2.45)
E-stability depends upon the eigenvalues of the following:
DTa(a¯) = M +K (2.46)
DTc(a¯, c¯) = F
′ ⊗M + I2 ⊗K (2.47)
The inequalities describing when the model is E-Stable are not simple
nor intuitive involving many different cases and sub-cases. Figure 4 illustrates
the results in the same format as was used in the previous sections. (4a) shows
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determinacy and E-Stability over φ and α when λ is fixed at .3. Note that
as φ increases the lowest value of α that results in E-Stability also increases.
Determinacy and E-stability differ so much only in a small region with φ < 1 and
α > 1 is both determinate and E-Stable. In (4b) we fix φ = .164 and let λ float.
Here we conjecture that for any λ the model is E-Stable for all values of α > 1,
and the determinacy results are similar to before. In (4c) we fix φ at 6.11. Here
we conjecture that for sufficiently low λ the model is E-Unstable for all values of
α. There also do not appear to be any values of α that are both determinate and
E-Stable which is in line with what we observe in (4a).
Two Period Ahead Expected Nominal GDP Growth Rule
To assess determinacy under the two period ahead NGDP growth rule we set
yt = (xt, pit, xt+1, pit+1) and include two identity equations. We were unable to find
analytic conditions for determinacy, however in figure 5 it appears that the REE is
determinate for all parameter values considered.
There are however analytic conditions for E-stability. Now we write the
system in the form:
yt = ME
∗
t yt+1 +KE
∗
t yt+2 + Pvt. (2.48)
Now the T-map becomes:
T (a, c) = ((M +K)a,McF +KcF 2). (2.49)
E-stability depends upon the eigenvalues of the following having real parts
less than one:
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E-Stability of Forward Looking NGDP Growth Feedback Rule -
Alternative Information
(a) β = .99 and λ = 0.3 (b) β = .99 and φ = 0.164
(c) β = .99 and φ = 6.11
FIGURE 4. All three figures show the regions of determinacy E-Stability over
different regions of the parameter space. In all figures β = .99. In figure (a) λ is
fixed at .3. In figure (b) φ is fixed at 0.164. In figure φ is fixed at 6.11.
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DTa = M +K, (2.50)
DTc = F
′ ⊗M + (F 2)′ ⊗K. (2.51)
While conditions for DTa having eigenvalues with real parts less than one,
the eigenvalues of DTc do not appear to have conditions that are able to express or
interpret. In general, it appears to be necessary that α > 1, although for low values
of φ and high values of λ this appears to increase to α > 2. On the other hand
for larger values of φ and low values of λ the REE is E-unstable for all values of α
considered. Using the alternative information set leads to all values of α resulting
in E-instability.
Current Nominal GDP Level Rule
When the rule (2.4) is used with i = 0 we set yt = (xt, pit, pt)
′
. Now the
system of equations includes an identity for the price level.
pt = pt−1 + pit
Following the results of Giannoni (2014), we know that determinacy holds for
all values of α > 0. While there is no obvious way to extend this analytical result
to E-stability, it does appear that the same condition holds for E-stability as well.
These results are robust to both information assumptions. This makes the rule
desirable at least from the perspective that no matter how aggressive the central
bank is about achieving its target, the REE will always be both determinate and
E-stable.
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E-Stability of Two Period Ahead Expected NGDP Feedback Rule
(a) β = .99 and λ = 0.3 (b) β = .99 and φ = 0.164
(c) β = .99 and φ = 6.11
FIGURE 5. All three figures show the regions of determinacy E-Stability over
different regions of the parameter space. In all figures β = .99. In figure (a) λ is
fixed at .3. In figure (b) φ is fixed at 0.164. In figure φ is fixed at 6.11.
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E-Stability of Two Period Ahead Expected NGDP Feedback Rule:
Alternative Information
(a) β = .99 and λ = 0.3 (b) β = .99 and φ = 0.164
(c) β = .99 and φ = 6.11
FIGURE 6. All three figures show the regions of determinacy E-Stability over
different regions of the parameter space. In all figures β = .99. In figure (a) λ is
fixed at .3. In figure (b) φ is fixed at 0.164. In figure φ is fixed at 6.11.
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E-Stability of NGDP Level Feedback Rule
(a) β = .99 and λ = 0.3 (b) β = .99 and φ = 0.164
(c) β = .99 and φ = 6.11
FIGURE 7. All three figures show the regions of determinacy E-Stability over
different regions of the parameter space. In all figures β = .99. In figure (a) λ is
fixed at .3. In figure (b) φ is fixed at 0.164. In figure φ is fixed at 6.11.
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E-Stability of Expected NGDP Level Feedback Rule
(a) β = .99 and λ = 0.3 (b) β = .99 and φ = 0.164
(c) β = .99 and φ = 6.11
FIGURE 8. All three figures show the regions of determinacy E-Stability over
different regions of the parameter space. In all figures β = .99. In figure (a) λ is
fixed at .3. In figure (b) φ is fixed at 0.164. In figure φ is fixed at 6.11.
One Period Ahead Nominal GDP Level Rule
The interest rate rule which targets nominal GDP’s level one period ahead
we can see that higher values for φ lead to a very small range of values of α that
result in a determinate and E-stable equilibrium while for low values of φ the range
becomes quite large.
46
Two Period Ahead Nominal GDP Level Rule
Under the interest rate rule that targets the level of nominal GDP
two periods in the future, the system described in (2.5) will have yt =
(xt, pit, xt+1, pit+1, pt+1) with identity equations for xt+1 and pit+1. The price
level equation is written for pt+2. We were unable to find analytic results for
determinacy, but all parameterizations considered result in a determinate REE.
The system of equations used to study E-stability is in the same form as the
one used for the two period ahead NGDP growth rule but now with yt = (xt, pit, pt).
The numerical results show that for most parameterizations α > 1 ensures E-
stability of the REE, with some deviations for extreme values of λ.
Similar to the two period ahead NGDP growth rule, using alternate
information leads to most but for this rule note all values of α resulting in E-
instability. We do find that for sufficiently small values of φ and λ there are values
of α which result in E-stability.
2.5 Conclusion
We have analyzed determinacy and E-Stability of equilibria when feedback
rules that respond to nominal GDP growth and level are used. When the rule
responds to contemporaneous nominal GDP growth the model is determinate
and E-Stable only when the response to deviations of nominal GDP growth away
from its target is at least greater than one for one. We also found that targeting
current NGDP level leads to determinacy and E-stability for all parameterizations
considered. When the interest rate responds to expectations of nominal GDP
growth it depends on information assumptions. If the central bank is assumed
to know the current period output gap then determinacy and E-Stability regions
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E-Stability of Two Period Ahead NGDP Level Feedback Rule
(a) β = .99 and λ = 0.3 (b) β = .99 and φ = 0.164
(c) β = .99 and φ = 6.11
FIGURE 9. All three figures show the regions of determinacy E-Stability over
different regions of the parameter space. In all figures β = .99. In figure (a) λ is
fixed at .3. In figure (b) φ is fixed at 0.164. In figure φ is fixed at 6.11.
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E-Stability of Two Period Ahead NGDP Level Feedback Rule:
Alternative Information
(a) β = .99 and λ = 0.3 (b) β = .99 and φ = 0.164
(c) β = .99 and φ = 6.11
FIGURE 10. All three figures show the regions of determinacy E-Stability over
different regions of the parameter space. In all figures β = .99. In figure (a) λ is
fixed at .3. In figure (b) φ is fixed at 0.164. In figure φ is fixed at 6.11.
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depend greatly on the size of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption parameter. This rule can also introduce something known as “inverted
aggregate demand logic” which also inverts the Taylor principle. When it is
assumed however that the central bank uses private agents forecasts of the current
output gap then the results are difficult to completely characterize. It appears that
when the proportions of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the slope of
the Phillips Curve are correct the model is E-stable for all values of α > 1, however,
when φ is too large relative to λ like in Woodford (1999) then the model may never
be E-Stable with this interest rate rule. Ultimately a central bank choosing this
rule should be careful to ensure they are responding the right amount to nominal
GDP growth when setting interest rates. Additionally before jumping to serious
policy prescriptions we would need to consider the effects of a lagged impact of
policy changes.
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CHAPTER III
NGDP TARGETING AND FINANCIAL FRICTIONS
3.1 Introduction
Nominal GDP (NGDP) has been suggested yet not implemented as a nominal
anchor for the central bank. The alleged benefits are the built-in countercyclical
monetary policy, attractive zero lower bound properties, and its interaction with
debt. We will be most concerned about the interaction between NGDP targeting
and debt.
Under NGDP targeting, if NGDP falls either due to a fall in output or a
fall in prices this causes the central bank to expand the money supply and lower
interest rates increasing output and prices and bringing NGDP towards its target.
With regard to the zero lower bound a strict NGDP level target implies a
very similar path for nominal interest rates as the optimal monetary policy. This is
a policy involving rates being held at zero past the point that inflation and output
start taking off.
Finally NGDP targets imply an interesting relationship with aggregate debt.
Because NGDP targeting leads to higher inflation when real output is low it also
lowers the real value of nominal debt contracts. When real output is lower that
implies that households have less real resources available, so lowering the real
value of debt helps debtors when times are tough. In addition to this desirable
feature, Sheedy (2013) shows that in an overlapping generations model with
incomplete markets an appropriate NGDP target ”completes” the market by
reducing uncertainty about future nominal income.
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We assess whether NGDP targeting may have desirable traits when financial
frictions are present. We examine the following six NGDP based monetary policies:
i.) NGDP growth targeting interest rate rule, ii.) NGDP level targeting interest
rate rule, iii.) optimized version of i, iv.) optimized version of ii, v.) NGDP growth
targeting, and vi.) NGDP level targeting. In i-iv the central bank sets the interest
rate in proportion to deviations of the targeted value from the target while in v-vi
the central bank can perfectly achieve its targets.
The framework we use to examine the performance of these policies is
the model developed in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2016). In this model there are
two types of households, patient and impatient. The patient households have a
lower marginal utility of consumption than the impatient households, as a result
the patient households save so that the impatient households may borrow to
finance consumption. Due to the costs associated with creating loans and fraud
borrowers pay a higher interest rate on loans than savers receive. Other than
these modifications the model closely resembles the standard New Keynesian (NK)
model.
This paper relates to two different strands of the literature. First this is
intended to add to the understanding of the desirability of monetary policy that
targets NGDP’s level or growth rate. It also builds upon the literature focused on
debt and financial frictions in DSGE models.
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco President John Williams (Williams,
2016) identifies NGDP targeting as a policy that would have beneficial properties in
a world with a low natural rate of interest. He cites the fact that the policy delivers
the “lower for longer” property of the optimal response at the zero lower bound,
it guards against debt deflation, and a low natural rate of interest leads to more
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inflation under NGDP targeting, which leaves more room for monetary policy to
respond to negative shocks.
Sumner (2012) also has argued for the merits of NGDP targeting. In
particular that the emphasis on inflation as a target made central banks’ response
to the Great Recession less expansionary than it should have been. Had central
banks focused on stabilizing NGDP they would have responded to the recession
much more aggressively. He also argues that it may stabilize asset markets. It could
limit periods of extreme NGDP growth which are tied to bubble formation. It
also helps limit the severity of drops in NGDP which can trigger financial crises.
Sumner supports this with the fact that the first financial crisis around the Great
Depression occurred one year into the depression.
Sumner also claims that an NGDP target is easy for the public to understand
and Woodford (2012) agrees. Woodford also argues that the NGDP strikes the best
balance between implementing optimal monetary policy and choosing a policy that
can be practically explained, verified, and implemented.
We find that in our model most NGDP targeting policies would provide
preferable outcomes to more traditional policies with a few exceptions. One of these
exceptions is an interest rate rule that adjusts based upon NGDP growth. We use
impulse response graphs and present the unconditional variance of the endogenous
variables to help understand the reasons why some rules are preferred to others.
The rest of the paper is broken down as follows: We start with a literature
review in section 3.2 in section 3.3 we present the linearized NK model with
financial frictions derived in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2016). Then in section
3.4 we present and explain the NGDP targeting policies as well as the more
conventional policies. We present welfare calculations, impulse response graphs and
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interpretations and unconditional varainces for all the policies under consideration
in section 3.5.
3.2 Literature Review
Sheedy (2014) looks at a topic similar to this paper. Sheedy demonstrates
that in the presence of incomplete markets NGDP targeting makes households
better off by making the nominal income more predictable. By allowing for prices
to move counter-cyclically the policy stabilizes the debt to GDP ratio which ensures
effective risk sharing. When real GDP falls inflation must increase which reduces
the real value of debt in proportion to the fall in real GDP. This helps to better
share risk amongst households.
In Gar´ın et al. (2016) the authors compare the welfare losses of NGDP
targeting with inflation targeting, output gap targeting and a Taylor rule in a
NK model featuring price and wage rigidities. They find that NGDP targeting
outperforms inflation targeting and the Taylor rule and is slightly worse than
output gap targeting unless the output gap is observed with noise. They also
compare the same three policies in an estimated medium-scale DSGE model
featuring capital, habit formation for consumption, variable capital utilization, and
indexation of wages and prices to past inflation. They find that the results from the
simpler model still hold under the more realistic model.
Jensen (2002) uses a linearized NK model featuring output and inflation
persistence to compare the welfare properties of policies derived from quadratic
loss functions that either target inflation or NGDP growth targeting. The author
finds that so long as there are shocks that pose a trade-off to stabilizing output
and inflation, NGDP growth targeting results in lower welfare losses than inflation
targeting.
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Looking a bit further back into the literature Hall and Mankiw (1994)
conduct simulations to examine the performance of different NGDP targeting rules
at reducing the standard deviation of key macroeconomic variables. They consider
level and growth targeting as well as a hybrid which targets growth and adjusts the
target based on the output gap. When real data is used to generate policy errors
in implementation they find that the price level would have significantly lower
standard deviations under all three policies than it experienced in the real world.
The level and hybrid targets lead to are able to achieve lower standard errors in
inflation as well. And the hybrid target achieves a lower standard deviation in
the output gap. All NGDP policies lead to a higher standard deviation of output
growth. Under no policy error the policies lead to lower standard deviations of all
of the relevant macroeconomic variables.
In Billi (2013) the author explores the ability of NGDP targets to both
avoid zero lower bound episodes and mitigate their effects. The paper compares
optimal discretionary NGDP level targets to optimal discretionary flexible inflation
targeting and it compares a Taylor rule and an NGDP interest rate rule both
subject to the zero lower bound. While inflation targeting requires positive trend
inflation in order to avoid a deflationary spiral, even zero trend inflation under
NGDP targeting avoids a deflationary spiral and NGDP targeting results in lower
welfare loss relative to the Ramsey plan than inflation targeting. During a zero
lower bound episode NGDP targeting raises inflation higher than an inflation
targeting policy would, which leads to a faster recovery that would otherwise
happen. Inflation targeting however does not allow inflation to rise above its
target. For the interest rate rules the author finds that the difference in welfare
loss between the rules are small when interest rate smoothing is present.
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McCallum (2015) shows that NGDP growth targeting is a special case of the
timeless optimal monetary policy with commitment. In McCallum and Nelson
(1999a) the authors compare the standard deviations of inflation, the output
gap, NGDP, and the nominal interest rate under inflation targeting and NGDP
targeting in an open-economy NK model. The policies in question are interest rate
rules which react to inflation or NGDP. The authors find again that overall NGDP
targeting outperforms inflation targeting.
Stability and uniqueness of equilibrium in models where NGDP targeting is
used has been a concern about the policy. In Mitra (2003) the author determines
the determinacy of the steady-state and E-stability of the rational expectations
equilibrium (REE) in a simple NK model with NGDP growth targeting. He finds
that NGDP growth targeting results in a unique steady-state and the REE is
E-Stable when contemporaneous growth is targeted. The author does find that
targeting expected NGDP growth leads to indeterminacy and the minimum state
variable solution is not E-Stable.
Honkapohja and Mitra (2014) compares an interest rate rule that targets
NGDP to an interest rate rule that targets the price level and the output gap.
All rules are subject to the zero lower bound, the model is a standard NK model,
and agents are assumed to make forecasts using infinite horizon learning of the
steady-state values of output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate. They prove
that both rules have expectationally stable targeted steady states when the price
adjustment costs are sufficiently small and they prove that for both rules the zero
lower bound constrained steady state is not expectationally stable. Comparing
interest rate rules with a quadratic loss function they find that when agents
take the central bank’s guidance of the particular rule into account both rules
outperform a simple Taylor rule and the NGDP rule outperforms the price level
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rule. Without the guidance the rules induce a smaller basin of attraction where
expectations converge to the intended steady state than a Taylor rule.
This paper is also related to research on financial frictions. Cu´rdia and
Woodford (2016) develops the model used in this paper. It is essentially a standard
NK model with two types of agents and financial frictions. They find that the
presence of financial frictions leads to substantial deviations in the responses of
endogenous variables to a variety of shocks. The authors then derive a quadratic
loss function from household ex-ante utility. They find that in a special case
the optimal target is similar to that of the standard NK model, and that the
interest rate rule that implement the policy responds to financial frictions and the
interest rate spread. To add the authors stress that despite the presence of a credit
spread and financial frictions do not lead to many differences in the optimal policy
response from standard models.
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) provides a different look at a New Keynesian
model with debt. They assume that there are patient and impatient households.
The impatient households borrow up to a constraint which is assumed to be less
than the present discounted value of their future income. They find that when
agents are debt constrained it gives rise to a variety of phenomena including:
Fisherian debt deflation, liquidity traps, backward sloping AD curves leading to the
paradoxes of thrift, toil and flexibility arising1, a Keynesian multiplier and support
for expansionary fiscal policy. They find that for a sufficiently large debt-overhang
a contraction in borrowing limits leads to a negative natural rate of interest.
1The paradox of thrift is well known, the paradox of toil refers to increases in the labor supply
leading to lower real output, and the paradox of flexibility refers to flexible prices actually leading
to less output.
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3.3 Model
Our analysis uses the linearized model derived in Cu´rdia and Woodford
(2016). They assume that there are two types of infinitely lived households,
ones who are patient and net savers and households who are impatient and net
borrowers. Each member of the household supplies a differentiated labor input and
earn a wage for it. Households can deposit funds in a bank and earn a return 1 + idt
and borrow at a higher rate. The households get utility from consumption and
disutility from labor. They choose consumption, labor supply, and whether to save
or borrow in order to maximize expected lifetime utility. The impatient households
have a higher marginal utility of consumption than the patient ones. A fraction pib
of households are impatient and every period a fraction δ of all households redraw
their type each period.
There is a banking sector which collects deposits from the patient households
and makes loans to impatient households. They earn a return on the loans and pay
out interest on the deposits. Financial frictions arise because real resources are used
in the production of loans and some loans are fraudulent. These frictions contribute
to the spread between the interest rate earned by savers and the rate paid by
borrowers. The real cost of producing loans is a function of both an exogenous
component and the current real quantity of loans.
Finally the product sector is in the same form as a standard NK model.
Intermediate goods producing firms with market power face a probability α that
they will be able to reset their wage every period. This gives rise to a Phillips curve
that looks similar to the standard one in the literature.
The endogenous variables in this model are idt , the depositor’s interest rate;
Yt, output; pit, inflation, Ωt, the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption the two
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types of households; λt, the average of the marginal utility of consumption the
two types of households; ωt, the spread between the rate depositors are paid and
the rate borrowers pay; and bt, the level of private debt. The exogenous variables
are Gt, government spending; c¯
h
t , the exogenous shock to household h’s marginal
utility of consumption; Ξt, shocks to the cost of producing loans; χt, the amount
of fraudulent loans; τt, subsidies to producers; µ
w
t , the wage markup; and b
g
t ,
government borrowing.
Log linearizing each household’s Euler equation and defining Ωt as the
difference in log deviation from steady state between the borrower and the saver’s
marginal utility then we have that:
Ωt = δˆEtΩt+1 + ωt, (3.1)
where ωt is the log deviation from the steady state of the spread between the
rate borrowers pay on loans and the rate paid to depositors. δˆ is a function of the
subjective discount factor, the steady state real interest rate paid to depositors,
the steady state spread, and the probability of having your preferences reset and
the relative proportions of the household types. In (3.1) we see that this ratio is
increasing with expectations of next period’s ratio and the spread between the
two interest rates. When the spread increases only the borrower’s Euler equation
is affected. The increased spread lowers consumption and increases the marginal
utility of the borrowers increasing the difference in the marginal utilities.ith
Additionally the two household type’s Euler equations can be combined as a
weighted average and plugged into aggregate demand to produce something that
looks closer to the traditional New Keynesian IS curve
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Yt = EtYt+1−σ¯(iavgt −Etpit+1)−Et∆gt+1−Et∆Ξt+1−ηsΞEt∆bt+1−σ¯sΩΩt+σ¯(sΩ+ψΩ)EtΩt+1,
(3.2)
where Yt is the log deviation from steady state of output, i
avg
t is the average
between the interest rate paid by the borrowers and the interest rate paid to
depositors it is equal to idt + pibωt, pit+1 is inflation. The variable Ξt is defined as:
Ξt ≡ b¯
η
Y¯
(Ξ˜t − ¯˜Ξt),
where Ξ˜t is the exogenous component for the real cost of loans, b¯ and Y¯
are the steady state values of real private loans and output respectively, and η
determines the contribution of the level of real loans to the cost of producing loans.
When η = 0 the level of loans do not contribute to the cost of producing loans. The
variable bt is the current level of real private debt and sΞ is the steady state share
of output eaten up by the loan production costs.
The variable gt captures shocks to aggregate expenditures. It is defined as:
gt = scc¯t +Gt,
were scc¯t is the weighted average of the log deviations of the exogenous
disturbances to marginal utility of the two types, c¯bt and c¯
s
t , multiplied by the
steady state consumption share of each type, and Gt is the deviation from steady
state of government spending as a percentage of steady state output.
∆Xt is the first difference of the variable Xt. The constant σ¯ is a weighted
average of the two households CRRA utility parameters. The constant sΩ is a
function of relative proportions of the two household types, the share of output of
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each type’s consumption, and their CRRA utility parameters. Finally ψΩ depends
on the same parameters as δˆ.
The Phillips curve is derived in usual fashion linearizing the profit maximizing
first order condition for firms resetting their price and linearizing the evolution of
the price level:
pit = βEtpit+1 + ut + κ(Yt − Y nt )− ξσ¯−1(Ξt + ηsΞbt) + ξ(sΩ + pib − γb)Ωt, (3.3)
where β is the subjective discount factor, ξ is a function of the reset
probability, the subjective discount factor, the elasticity of output with respect
to labor, the Frisch elasticity of labor, and the CES parameter for the differentiated
goods produced by the monopolistically competitive firms. The parameter κ is:
κ ≡ ξ(φ(1 + ν)− 1 + σ¯−1),
where 1/φ is the output elasticity with respect to labor, 1/ν is the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply. The constant γb in (3.3) depends upon the relative
proportions of borrowers and savers, the ratio of the borrower’s marginal utility
to the average marginal utility, and the scalars multiplying the disutility of labor in
the objective function of the household.
The variable ut is a linear combination of µ
w
t and τt, which are the log
deviation from the steady state of the wage markup and the negative of the log
deviation from the steady state of the untaxed fraction of firm revenues. Finally,
Y nt is the natural level of output in log deviations from steady state form. It
is a linear combination of h¯t, the labor disutility preference shifter in deviation
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from steady state form, zt, the log deviations from the steady state of aggregate
productivity, and gt.
The log linearized equation governing the interest rate spread is obtained by
log linearizing the first order condition for the financial intermediaries:
ωt = ωbbt + ωχχt + ωΞΞt, (3.4)
where bt is the level of real private borrowing in log deviation from steady
state form and χt is the deviation of the exogenous component of the quantity of
fraudulent loans from its steady sate value multiplied by a term involving steady
state debt and a parameter governing the contribution of the debt level towards
fraud. The coefficients are functions of steady state debt, interest rate spread, debt
to GDP, loan production costs, and fraud.
Log linearizing the evolution of private debt and making some substitutions
leads to:
bt = κ˜1c¯
b
t + κ˜2c¯
s
t + κ˜3λ
t
b + κ˜4λ
s
t + κ˜5Ωt + κ˜6µ
w
t + κ˜7h¯t + κ˜8Yt + κ˜9zt+
κ˜10ωt + κ˜11(i
d
t−1 − pit) + κ˜12(bt−1 + ωt−1) + κ˜13(bgt − δ(1 + r¯d)bgt−1) + κ˜14(Gt + Ξt),
(3.5)
where the κ˜ terms are functions of model parameters and steady state values
of model variables. The variable bgt refers to government debt at time t.
3.4 Monetary Policy
We will compare four different NGDP based monetary policies with four
conventional monetary policies and the optimal policy for the model. The key
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policies of interest are ones that involve targeting the level or the growth of
nominal GDP. We consider interest rate rules that respond to deviations of nominal
GDP growth from the growth of the natural level of output and the targeted
inflation rate and the deviations of nominal GDP level from the natural level of
output and the targeted price level plus some random policy error. In addition to
these two, we also consider the case where monetary policymakers can perfectly hit
their targets for NGDP growth or level plus a mean zero random disturbance.
The traditional policies considered are two Taylor rules, inflation targeting,
and a flexible inflation target.
For the interest rate rules considered the central bank adjusts the money
supply to achieve a target for idt . One rule we consider (equation 3.6) adjusts the
interest rate based on deviations of nominal GDP growth, pit + Yt − Yt−1, from the
bank’s target for it, Y nt − Y nt−1, which is the growth in the natural level of output
and we assume the targeting rate of inflation is zero.
idt = ϕ(pit + (Yt − Yt−1)− (Y nt − Y nt−1)) + t (3.6)
We also look at an interest rate rule that adjusts based upon deviations of the
level of NGDP (equation 3.7), pt + Yt, from a targeted level of NGDP equal to Y
n
t .
Here pt is the log price level and the targeted price level is normalized to be equal
to one.
idt = ϕ(pt + Yt − Y nt ) + t (3.7)
In addition we look at standard versions of the Taylor rule for comparison
purposes. Equations (3.8) and (3.9) are standard Taylor rules where output is
tarted to either equal its steady state value or its natural level.
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idt = ϕpipit + ϕY (Yt − Y nt ) + t (3.8)
idt = ϕpipit + ϕY Yt + t (3.9)
In addition to the interest rate rules we also consider the case where the
central bank always achieves its target, under these rules the bank adjusts their
preferred policy instrument (in the model this comes in the form of the deposit
rate) until it achieves the desired target. With two exceptions these policies are
assumed to be implemented with error. The first of these policies (equation 3.10)
is a target for NGDP growth, where policy adjusts to set it exactly equal to the
growth rate of the natural level of GDP.
pit + Yt − Yt−1 − t = Y nt − Y nt−1 (3.10)
In addition we consider a policy (equation 3.11) where the central bank
attempts to set the level of NGDP pt + Yt equal to the natural level of output.
pt + Yt − t = Y nt (3.11)
We also consider an inflation target (equation 3.12) where the central bank
conducts monetary policy in order to achieve zero percent inflation (with error).
pit + t = 0 (3.12)
The target in (3.13) is a flexible inflation target and the optimal target in a
simple NK model derived from the first order conditions associated with minimizing
the welfare loss function derived from the quadratic approximation to the ex-ante
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household utility.
pit + λx(yt − yt−1) = 0, (3.13)
yt = Yt − Y ∗t ,
Y ∗t = Y
n
t +
1
ωyσ¯ + 1
Ξt.
With rules in the form of (3.10-3.13) concerns of practicality can arise.
Traditionally in the literature, it is assumed that the central bank follows
an interest rate rule that is conditioned on exogenous variables and lags and
expectations of endogenous variables. Due to the complexity of this system the
expressions for these interest rate rules are long and complex leaving little intuitive
interpretation so we have chosen not to reproduce them. Be aware however that
in the background something like one of these rules is being implemented or the
central bank is behaving as if they are carrying out an interest rate rule that
achieves its target.
We will evaluate the rules using welfare calculations based on a second order
approximation to the ex-ante utility function for the representative household,
impulse response functions, and the unconditional variance of key endogenous
variables.
3.5 Results
We find that NGDP based policies usually beat out the traditional policies
of Taylor rules and inflation targets. None of these policies outperform the flexible
inflation target in this model. To understand why NGDP level policies and most
NGDP growth policies outperform most of the traditional policies we will examine
impulse response functions to show how the NGDP policies typically remain close
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to the flexible inflation target impulse response functions even when (3.8), (3.9) and
(3.12) deviate. Then to further understand the source of the welfare gains we will
present key unconditional variance and covariances for these rules.
Our calibration is the same as the one used in Cu´rdia and Woodford
(2016), we set baseline ϕ for both the NGDP growth and level rule equal to 2
to start. We will also present welfare results for interest rate rules where the
response coefficients are selected between zero and twenty to maximize welfare.
Welfare is calculated using a second order approximation of the ex-ante utility
of a representative household. Using the computed welfare we calculate the
percentage increase in consumption necessary to make the household indifferent
between the policy in question and the optimal policy derived using the linear
quadratic approximation. Since there are two types of households we present three
scenarios. In the first only borrower’s consumption is increased. In the second only
saver’s consumption is increased. Finally, we present the case where both types of
household’s consumption are increased by the same percentage. These ultimately
present the same ordering of the different policies in terms of the preference of a
household’s lifetime utility. The relative size of the increase needed is larger for
savers because their marginal utility of consumption is always lower for a given
level of consumption. The relative percentage increase for both is smaller than the
others because it is boosting aggregate consumption.
Because flexible inflation targeting is the optimal policy under a typical
representative agent NK model and the particular flexible inflation target is
calibrated to be the optimal policy under no financial frictions in this model with a
weight on deviations in real output growth from its target, λx, is equal to 0.1256. It
performs almost as well as the optimal policy.
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TABLE 2. Consumption Equivalent Welfare
Policy Borrower Saver Both
Flexible Inflation Target 0.002 0.003 0.001
Optimal NGDP
Level Rule
0.004 0.006 0.002
NGDP Level Rule 0.004 0.006 0.003
NGDP Level Target 0.007 0.011 0.004
Optimal Taylor
Output Gap Rule
0.008 0.012 0.005
Optimal NGDP
Growth Rule
0.010 0.016 0.006
NGDP Growth Target 0.011 0.017 0.007
Inflation Targeting 0.030 0.052 0.019
Optimal Taylor
Rule
0.046 0.095 0.031
Taylor Gap Rule 0.063 0.130 0.042
Taylor Rule 0.069 0.142 0.046
NGDP Growth Rule 0.550 1.019 0.345
The next best is the interest rate rule that responds to deviations in NGDP’s
level from its target with an optimized response parameter set at ϕ = 1.5074. This
is not too far from the calibration we set for the unoptimized rule, ϕ = 2 which falls
a bit behind it in terms of welfare performance. The level target is behind both of
those yet still above any traditional policies.
The NGDP growth based policies do not appear to be preferable to level
based policies. The unoptimized interest rate rule performs the worst amongst any
of the policies. The optimized interest rate rule sets ϕ = 20 and along with the
growth based target is in the middle of the pack amongst policies considered.
A Taylor rule which responds to deviations in real output from its natural
level with optimized weights ϕpi = 19.9975 and ϕY = 3.0489 is the best amongst
traditional monetary policy. Inflation targeting is below most of the NGDP based
policies, as are the optimized Taylor rule that doesn’t respond to the output gap
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with ϕpi = 8.007 and ϕY = 0.049945, the unoptimized Taylor rules were set equal to
ϕpi = 2 and ϕY = .25 for comparison.
While the flexible target requires less extra consumption to leave the
representative household indifferent to the optimal policy, it is not that much
closer in consumption terms than some of the NGDP based policies. In addition
one could argue that the NGDP based policies would be easier for policymakers
to achieve as the flexible inflation target here involves estimating structural
relationships in the economy, which could be tenuous, and also estimating not just
the natural level of output but the degree of financial frictions. In addition, an
NGDP target would appear to be easier for the public to understand when forming
expectations of future policy than the flexible inflation target.
Impulse Response Functions
We now discuss impulse response functions (IRF) to provide an explanation
for why NGDP policies perform so well overall, in particular, the level based
policies. We use the IRF for the flexible inflation target as a baseline to compare
the other policies. The full suite of IRFs can be found in the appendix.
The IRFs for productivity shocks give us our first look at why the NGDP
growth interest rate rule performs so poorly. The IRFs for the NGDP policies
are presented in figure 11b where we can see that the NGDP growth interest rate
rule’s responses are sometimes closer to the responses generated by a simple Taylor
rule as presented in figure 11a. Most policies generated responses that were close
to the flexible inflation target. The exact NGDP targets are able to very closely
track the flexible inflation targets as well. The preferred responses to productivity
shocks feature small decreases of the depositor interest rate which gradually fades
out, inflation slightly increasing and the fading out quickly, a small increase in the
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interest rate spread and the level of private debt which further increase and die out,
and a large increase in output which dies out gradually. The NGDP growth based
interest rate rule features IRFs closer to the Taylor rule which also features a larger
decrease in the depositor’s interest rate and some deflation. For both rules output
will consistently fall below the natural level which leads to deflation. Under labor
supply shocks which can be found in the appendix (Figs. 24a and 24b) responses
feature similar responses given that the change in preferences leads to a smaller
increase in the natural level of output.
The impulse response functions for increases in the costs of loan production
and the quantity of fraudulent loans are on display in figures 12 and 13
respectively. As with productivity shocks the exact targets result in responses very
similar to those under flexible inflation targeting, and the NGDP level interest
rate rule also results in similar IRFs as well. The growth rate rule and the other
traditional monetary policies feature larger and longer drops in output and inflation
in response to these financial frictions shocks. All policies lead to large drops in
interest rates, increases in spreads, and drops in private borrowing.
Responses to an increase of τt which implies an increase in after-tax revenues
by the firms, these are on display in figure 14. The responses are identical to
responses to µwt , which can be found in the appendix in figure 25. These shocks
have an inflationary effect in (3.3), the flexible inflation target responds to the
increase in inflation with a decrease in output level initially and some negative
output growth following that along with some positive inflation. Eventually, output
growth becomes positive and there is a small spell of deflation. The exact targets
for NGDP level and growth replicate the general path of these two variables but
because output and inflation (price level) are weighted equally under these targets
the initial response of output is smaller and the response of inflation is larger. The
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(a) Impulse response functions under traditional policies.
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(b) Impulse response functions under NGDP based policies.
FIGURE 11. Impulse response functions for Yt, pit, i
d
t , bt, and ωt to productivity
shocks.
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(a) Impulse response functions under traditional policies.
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(b) Impulse response functions under NGDP based policies.
FIGURE 12. Impulse response functions for Yt, pit, i
d
t , bt, and ωt to loan cost
shocks.
71
0 10 20 30
-2
-1
0
Yt
Taylor Rule
Taylor Rule Gap
Inflation Target
Flex Target
0 10 20 30
-0.2
-0.1
0
t
0 10 20 30
-4
-2
0
it
d
0 10 20 30
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
bt
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
t
(a) Impulse response functions under traditional policies.
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(b) Impulse response functions under NGDP based policies.
FIGURE 13. Impulse response functions for Yt, pit, i
d
t , bt, and ωt to shocks to the
amount of fraudulent loans.
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interest rate rules also track these movements fairly closely. The main deviation
between these rules and the flexible target is that the depositor interest rate
actually falls under a flexible inflation target while the interest rate spread and
private borrowing increase and fall by much more compared to the NGDP policies.
The more traditional policies match the flexible inflation target less well to varying
degrees.
The IRFs in response to government borrowing shocks (Fig. 15) look
very similar with respect to idt , bt, and ωt, but deviate in the response of output
and inflation. The policies that featured the lowest welfare loss relative to the
optimal policy featured small increases in output which fade out quickly and small
fluctuations in inflation. The traditional policies feature larger increases in output
than any of the other policies and a small spike in inflation that quickly fades out.
The NGDP growth interest rate rule features a smaller increase in output which is
followed by further increases in output before gradually returning to steady state
and inflation follows a similar path.
Responses to policy error also differ widely across policies (Figs. 16a and
16b). When there is a contractionary policy error under NGDP level targeting
only the current value of the policy error is pushing the NGDP level away from
its target. Under NGDP growth targeting however these errors accumulate and
temporarily push output even further below the initial drop. Notice that with the
NGDP level target and interest rate rule and the NGDP growth target and interest
rate rule that the IRFs are similar but not exactly the same. Part of this is because
an error in choosing an interest rate to set would have a different impact than an
error in choosing the target value for NGDP level or growth.
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(a) Impulse response functions under traditional policies.
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(b) Impulse response functions under NGDP based policies.
FIGURE 14. Impulse response functions for Yt, pit, i
d
t , bt, and ωt to tax shocks.
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(b) Impulse response functions under NGDP based policies.
FIGURE 15. Impulse response functions for Yt, pit, i
d
t , bt, and ωt to shocks to the
level of public borrowing.
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(b) Impulse response functions under NGDP based policies.
FIGURE 16. Impulse response functions for Yt, pit, i
d
t , bt, and ωt to policy error.
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Unconditional Variance
We use the REE associated with each policy to find the unconditional
variance of key variables. These variances are displayed in Tables 3 to 15. We
will use this section to discuss sources of the welfare differences across the different
policies.
First we compare the NGDP level based policies (Tabs 8, 10, and 12) to the
optimal policy (3) and the flexible inflation target (4). What sticks out most is how
low the variance of inflation is for the optimal policy. The flexible inflation target is
is the closest to the variance to the optimal policy. The NGDP level based policies
all feature a variance of inflation among the closest to the optimal policy and the
flexible inflation target. In addition to inflation, the NGDP level targets all deliver
lower output variance than most other policies, including the optimal policy. The
variance of private debt also slightly lower across NGDP level targets compared to
the optimal policy. The variance of the interest rate spread and the interest rate
paid to depositors have variances that are similar across all five policies.
With the NGDP growth based policies (Tabs 7, 9, and 11) however in some
cases there are large deviations from the variances that prevail under the optimal
policy. The exact target for NGDP growth leads to a higher variance of inflation
than any of the level based policies, although it is still fairly small. The optimal
NGDP growth interest rate rule actually features lower inflation variance than an
exact NGDP level target. But the unoptimized NGDP growth interest rate rule
features the highest variance of inflation for any policy considered. The growth-
based interest rate rule also results in higher variance of output, interest rate
spread, and depositor interest rate.
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As far as the conventional policies the Taylor rules and the inflation target
can be found in Tables 5-6 and 13-15. The unoptimized Taylor rules feature
high variance of inflation and output relative to most of the other policies. The
optimized Taylor rule still features higher inflation and output variance, but the
optimized Taylor gap rule brings inflation and output variance to values that are
close to most of the NGDP based policies. The inflation target features somewhat
larger inflation variance due to policy errors directly impacting inflation whereas
under the NGDP targets policy errors can be spread across inflation and real
output.
While the optimal policy minimizes inflation across all rules under
consideration, the NGDP level target minimizes output variance, the optimal
Taylor output gap rule has the lowest variance of private debt with the NGDP level
and growth targets close behind, the variance of the interest rate spread and the
depositor rate are smallest under the optimal Taylor rule.
The Role of Debt
A natural question would be what role debt actually plays in the desirability
of the NGDP policies. One way to explore this is by looking at the welfare results
for a similar representative agent model. The results are displayed in Table 16.
The most striking difference is that with a representative agent inflation targeting
becomes the second most preferred choice to flexible inflation targeting. This might
imply that the presence of debt is driving our results, however running the model
with borrowing but no financial frictions yields the same outcome.
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TABLE 3. Optimal Policy
Unconditional Variances
Inflation 0.0594
Output 149.9985
Private Debt 13087.1013
Spread 188.8153
Depositor Rate 136.7203
TABLE 4. Flexible Inflation
Target
Unconditional Variances
Inflation 0.1425
Output 75.0301
Private Debt 13038.9964
Spread 192.3647
Depositor Rate 139.8009
TABLE 5. Taylor Rule
Unconditional Variances
Inflation 2.6500
Output 1004.9558
Private Debt 13135.0834
Spread 185.1502
Depositor Rate 111.9412
TABLE 6. Taylor Gap Rule
Unconditional Variances
Inflation 2.2731
Output 1023.9337
Private Debt 13135.0612
Spread 185.1488
Depositor Rate 111.5488
TABLE 7. NGDP Growth
Target
Unconditional Variances
Inflation 0.8666
Output 50.0522
Private Debt 12985.3281
Spread 194.2096
Depositor Rate 144.0994
TABLE 8. NGDP Level Target
Unconditional Variances
Inflation 0.6533
Output 30.7413
Private Debt 12985.3657
Spread 194.1314
Depositor Rate 142.2278
TABLE 9. NGDP Growth
Interest Rate Rule
Unconditional Variances
Inflation 24.7492
Output 410.1599
Private Debt 13051.7203
Spread 206.0169
Depositor Rate 263.9703
TABLE 10. NGDP Level
Interest Rate Rule
Unconditional Variances
Inflation 0.5101
Output 63.5297
Private Debt 13019.1650
Spread 192.2970
Depositor Rate 134.9671
TABLE 11. Optimal NGDP
Growth
Interest Rate Rule
Unconditional Variances
Inflation 0.5976
Output 40.8073
Private Debt 12992.8962
Spread 194.9780
Depositor Rate 150.6716
TABLE 12. Optimal NGDP
Level
Interest Rate Rule
Unconditional Variances
Inflation 0.4909
Output 87.3074
Private Debt 13029.7332
Spread 191.7117
Depositor Rate 132.6492
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TABLE 13. Optimal Taylor Rule
Unconditional Variances
Inflation 1.1409
Output 1072.7638
Private Debt 13145.0611
Spread 183.5256
Depositor Rate 101.3136
TABLE 14. Optimal
Taylor Gap Rule
Unconditional Variances
Inflation 0.5678
Output 71.6668
Private Debt 12969.2653
Spread 191.8936
Depositor Rate 130.6403
TABLE 15. Inflation Targeting
Unconditional Variances
Inflation 1.5625
Output 726.5008
Private Debt 13044.7180
Spread 187.2934
Depositor Rate 110.0239
It is the response to financial frictions that makes NGDP based policies
preferable to the traditional policies. Return to Figures 12 and 13 and observe
that while inflation targeting mostly delivers similar results to the flexible inflation
target it allows real GDP to fall in response to the shock. The explicit NGDP
level and inflation targets leave output relatively unchanged and the NGDP
interest rate rules leave output relatively unchanged initially compared to the more
traditional policies. The NGDP growth interest rate rule does leave output below
its steady state for longer than any other policy which might help explain its poor
performance overall.
Determinacy
One final question regarding the desirability of NGDP based policies is
whether or not the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) associated with each
is determinate. Under the calibration used NGDP level and growth targets lead to
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TABLE 16. Consumption Equivalent Welfare for Representative Agent
Policy Welfare Loss
Flexible Inflation Target 0.000
Inflation Target 0.003
Optimal NGDP
Level Rule
0.050
NGDP Level Rule 0.052
NGDP Level Target 0.054
Optimal NGDP
Growth Rule
0.057
Optimal Taylor
Gap Rule
0.267
Taylor Gap Rule 0.267
NGDP Growth Rule 0.330
Optimal Taylor Rule 0.353
NGDP Growth Target 0.478
Taylor Rule 1.447
TABLE 17. Consumption Equivalent Welfare no Financial Frictions
Policy Borrower Saver Both
Flexible Inflation Target 0.000 0.000 0.000
Inflation Target 0.002 0.004 0.001
Optimal NGDP
Level Rule
0.049 0.071 0.029
NGDP Level Rule 0.051 0.074 0.030
Optimal NGDP
Growth Rule
0.051 0.074 0.030
NGDP Level Target 0.053 0.077 0.031
Optimal Taylor
Gap Rule
0.254 0.392 0.152
Taylor Gap Rule 0.254 0.392 0.152
NGDP Growth Rule 0.316 0.480 0.187
Optimal Taylor Rule 0.450 1.174 0.315
NGDP Growth Target 0.455 0.740 0.274
Taylor Rule 1.362 1.973 0.761
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determinate REEs. Further exploration of determinacy as well as E-stability in an
NK model under NGDP growth targets can be found in Mitra (2003).
As for the interest rate rules, under the calibration used in this paper we find
that an NGDP growth interest rate rule leads to a determinate REE when ϕ is
strictly greater than one. For the NGDP level interest rate rule determinacy occurs
when ϕ is strictly greater than zero. This is in line with the results presented in
Brennan (2018b).
3.6 Conclusion
We have used an NK model with financial frictions and heterogeneous
preferences across households to examine the desirability of a variety of NGDP
targeting based rules. The model used featured fluctuations in interest rate spreads
due to loan production costs, fraud, and the total amount of lending. We looked at
the welfare calculations across different types of policies and found that outside
of the optimal policy and a flexible inflation target the NGDP based policies
generally performed better than other policies considered. We used the IRFs and
unconditional variances under these policies to provide an explanation for why
the NGDP based policies performed so well and in the case of an NGDP growth
interest rate rule why it performed so poorly. We found that the source of these
results was the presence of financial frictions as a model without financial frictions
and the representative agent version of the model preferred inflation targeting
above all NGDP based policies.
These results suggest that an NGDP based policy and in particular a rule of
thumb for the policy rate that responds to deviations of the level of NGDP from
its target might be preferable to current policy. One avenue for future research
would be to alter different aspects of the model and see if the results still hold.
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One possible alterations would be to see if the results still hold on a Bernanke-
Gertler-Gilchrist financial frictions model or if these results are unique to household
borrowing, allowing for trend inflation, and possibly incorporating wage stickiness,
habit persistence, and capital. Another possible change is allowing for the impact of
policy changes to occur with a lag.
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CHAPTER IV
NGDP TARGETING, TREND INFLATION, DETERMINACY, AND
E-STABILITY
4.1 Introduction
For decades many central banks have chosen to target inflation or seem to
follow a Taylor rule. The rationale for choosing these types of policies was that
they would help to keep inflation under control and also to minimize the volatility
of the output gap. The Great Recession showed that there are limitations to
these policies during severe recessions. Nominal GDP (NGDP) targeting has been
proposed as a policy that would be able to prevent severe recessions and as a policy
that puts stabilizing real output on equal footing with stabilizing the price level.
One of the key questions about the desirability of NGDP targeting is
whether it will keep expectations under control. By this we mean will it result in a
determinate and E-stable rational expectations equilibrium (REE). This question
has been answered by Mitra (2003) and Brennan (2018b) for the zero trend
inflation case, in this paper we will present results for non-zero trend inflation.
Cogley and Sbordone (2008) and Ascari and Ropele (2009) showed that under
positive trend inflation properties will depend on the value of trend inflation in
a basic New Keynesian (NK) model. Ascari et al. (2017b) and Kurozumi and
Van Zandweghe (2017) have shown that positive trend inflation will change the
E-stability properties of simple NK models. We will use a standard NK model with
non-zero trend inflation and partial indexation of prices to trend inflation and/or
past values of inflation and examine the determinacy and E-stability properties of
the REE under NGDP targeting interest rate rules.
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We are interested in NGDP targeting policies because NGDP has been
suggested as an alternative intermediate target for monetary policy. Its equal
weighting of output and inflation stabilization, countercyclical debt movements,
and desirable zero lower bound properties make it an attractive option.
Brennan (2018b) covers the determinacy and E-stability properties under
NGDP targeting policies with no trend inflation, but it is not necessarily be the
case that these properties still hold when nonzero trend inflation is present. It has
been shown, for example in Ascari and Ropele (2009), that the presence of trend
inflation can change the normal conditions for E-Stability and determinacy when
using a Taylor rule. Therefore the determinacy and E-stability requirements for
one of the interest rate rules we are considering may change under non-zero trend
inflation when the central bank is pursuing some form of NGDP targeting.
Our key result is that under nonzero trend inflation contemporaneous NGDP
level targeting results in determinacy and E-stability for all parameterizations
considered. While contemporaneous NGDP growth targets perform well, they
require a minimum value for the response parameter needed to yield E-stability
and determinacy in most settings. Rules which target the expected values of the
level or growth rate of NGDP can have very small regions of the parameter space
for which the equilibrium is determinate, E-stable, and covariance stationary. As
the CRRA utility parameter decreases the range of determinate and E-stable
values also decrease under the expected targets. Indexation serves to increase the
maximum value of Π that is allowed in the model, but that appears to be the only
effect.
The results in this paper as trend inflation falls to zero become identical to
the results found in Brennan (2018b). We build on these results by identifying what
levels of positive trend inflation lead to changes in these results, and which policies
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result in determinacy and E-stability properties that are robust to positive trend
inflation.
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 lays out the literature
on trend inflation in NK models and NGDP targeting in NK models and puts
our results in context with previous results. Section 3 lays out the linearized
model and proposed interest rate rules. Section 4 presents our numerical results.
Finally a derivation of the linearized model from first principles can be found in the
appendix.
4.2 Literature Review
This paper relates to a few different strands of the literature. We build upon
the work that has been done on the effects of nonzero trend inflation in a New
Keynesian model. Our results also add to the understanding of E-stability and the
convergence of least squares learning in linearized monetary DSGE models. Finally
we contribute to the literature on the desirability of NGDP targeting.
Trend Inflation
Nonzero trend inflation has been shown to cause significant changes to NK
models. One early example is Ascari (2004) where the author compares Calvo
pricing to Taylor staggered pricing under nonzero trend inflation. Under Calvo
pricing the impulse response functions and steady-state output values of the model
change significantly while under Taylor pricing they do not change much.
As those results imply, nonzero trend inflation leads to changes in the optimal
monetary policy in a NK model. Ascari and Ropele (2007) show that as trend
inflation increases it becomes difficult for monetary policy to stabilize inflation.
This is because the New Keynesian Phillips Curve becomes flatter as firms become
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concerned with making sure their prices are keeping up with inflation. As a result
the equilibrium is not always determinate under optimal discretionary policy.
Under commitment the optimal interest rate response to cost-push shocks becomes
more persistent as trend inflation increases. This is due to the NK Phillips Curve
becoming more forward-looking as trend inflation increases.
In Amano et al. (2007) the authors explore whether the type of nominal
rigidities matter for the effects of nonzero trend inflation in a simple DSGE
model. They use traditional Calvo pricing, a truncated Calvo pricing, and Taylor
pricing schemes. Their main findings are that all forms of price stickiness lead to
reductions in the unconditional mean of output, consumption and employment,
as well as an increase in the unconditional mean of inflation. Calvo pricing sees
the largest changes as a result of nonzero trend inflation, and other than the
unconditional mean of inflation the truncated Calvo pricing leads to larger changes
than Taylor pricing.
In ? the authors explore the changes in the Taylor principle as a result
of nonzero trend inflation in a New Keynesian model. They find that as trend
inflation increases policy-makers who want to target inflation aggressively need
to target output aggressively and vice versa. These results stem from the effects
of trend inflation on the slope of the Phillips curve and steady state relative price
dispersion.
Trend inflation and indexation has been proposed as a possible causal
pathway for the persistence of inflation. Cogley and Sbordone (2008) uses a simple
NK model with time-varying trend inflation to provide a theoretical motivation for
exploring the source of inflation persistence in U.S. data. They find that the data
provides support for a NK model with nonzero trend inflation and that there is not
much evidence of inflation indexation in pricing.
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Ascari et al. (2011a) provide empirical evidence of the effects of trend
inflation on equilibrium uniqueness. They show that increases in trend inflation
increase the probability of indeterminacy, although this period of indeterminacy
is limited to the second half of the 1970s. When the Federal Reserve began to
respond to inflation more aggressively the estimated REE became determinate
again.
It is not just Calvo vs Taylor pricing that has been compared in the
literature. Ascari et al. (2011b) compare the effects of nonzero trend inflation in
a New Keynesian (NK) model with Calvo pricing and with Rotemberg adjustment
costs by estimating a NK model with each form of pricing friction. They conclude
that Calvo pricing provides a better explanation of the data and attribute it to the
effects of Rotemberg pricing on aggregate demand.
Another concern about trend inflation in New Keynesian is how it changes
the effects of disinflation on output loss. In Ascari and Ropele (2013) the authors
use a medium-scale DSGE model to show the effects of trying to disinflate from
various levels of trend inflation. They unsurprisingly find that trying to go ”cold-
turkey” from high levels of trend inflation to no trend inflation leads to sizable
drops in output for about a year until output returns to steady-state. They do find
that it is the size of the disinflation that is driving this. A drop from 8% to 6% has
roughly the same impact on output as a drop from 4% to 2%, but larger drops lead
to larger responses in output.
Kobayashi and Muto (2013) present findings on the E-stability of various
interest rate rules that are conditioned on endogenous variables. They find
that under a rule that responds to contemporaneous variables E-stability and
determinacy appear concurrently and the region for coefficients in the rule which
yield both is shrinking as trend inflation is increasing. For future variables there is
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only a small area that is both determinate and E-stable and at low levels of trend
inflation most parameterizations yield E-stability but that begins to close as trend
inflation increases. Finally using lagged variables introduces some explosive regions
as well as regions with determinacy and E-instability.
The welfare impact of trend inflation is studied in a medium-scale New
Keynesian model in Ascari et al. (2015). Increasing trend inflation from 2% to 4%
is shown to lead to sizable drops in consumption equivalent welfare. The authors
identify the following mechanisms: sticky wages, trend growth in technology,
roundaboutness in production, and its interaction with shocks to the marginal
efficiency of investment. They also find that higher trend inflation has desirable
effects of dampening the response of output and other variables to shocks to the
marginal efficiency of investment.
In Branch and Evans (2017) the authors build on the work of Ascari and
Ropele to explore the behavior of the economy under trend inflation and imperfect
information. One of their key findings is that under a simple Fisher model as long
as the Taylor principle holds the REE is E-stable. They find that under certain
assumptions about the weight agents put on new inflation data can lead to beliefs
that inflation follows a random walk. These beliefs can be persistent leading to
high volatility of economic variables. And most importantly increasing the inflation
target can lead to random-walk beliefs.
The important factor for E-stability is transparency and credibility.
Other explorations of the properties of New Keynesian models under trend
inflation include: Bakhshi et al. (2003), Coibion et al. (2012), Ascari et al. (2017b),
Ascari et al. (2017a), Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) Arias et al. (2017) and
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011).
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Nominal GDP Targets
The first significant contributions on NGDP targets date back to the 1980s
and 1990s with the work of Taylor (1985), McCallum (1987), Dueker (1993), Hall
and Mankiw (1994), ?, and Ball (1997). In some sense NGDP targets can be traced
back to Friedman’s k-percent rule with certain assumptions imposed on the velocity
of money.
The earlier strain of the literature was focused on questions of a.) whether
economic variables were covariance stationary under an NGDP target (Ball (1997)
and Dennis (2001); and b.) whether we could characterize and/or what past
US monetary policy would have looked like if it was following an NGDP target
(McCallum and Nelson, 1999a). The literature during this period was also in more
focused on NGDP growth targets over level targets.
For a short period we see a lull in research on NGDP targets. During this
period the Taylor rule, inflation targeting, and optimal policy in DSGE models
became the main concern for monetary scholars. Interest in Nominal GDP
targeting did not pick up again in earnest until the 2007-2008 global financial crisis.
The modern NGDP targeting literature is primarily focused on questions of the
uniqueness and learnability of the REE as well as the welfare implications of NGDP
targeting.
One of the earliest attempts to assess determinacy and E-stability properties
under NGDP targeting was Mitra (2003). Mitra analyzed the determinacy and E-
stability of targeting NGDP growth precisely rather than through an interest rate
rule in a simple two-equation NK model. Mitra proves that when contemporaneous
growth is targeted the rational expectations equilibrium is always determinate.
When agents have current endogenous variables in their information set the REE is
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E-stable as well. If the central bank conducts policy assuming agents have rational
expectations the REE is E-unstable for common parameterizations of the model.
Mitra also finds that targeting expected growth leads to an indeterminate and E-
unstable REE.
Honkapohja and Mitra (2014) study the steady-state learning properties
of NGDP targeting in an NK model where interest rates are subject to the zero
lower bound. They compare a Taylor rule and interest rate rules that respond
to deviations from target for a price level target and an NGDP level target. All
rules are vulnerable to a deflationary steady state when the interest rate hits the
zero lower bound. This steady state is locally unstable under learning under both
price level and NGDP level targeting. They find that price level and NGDP level
targeting result in steady states with a larger domain of attraction and lower
volatility of aggregate variables when forward guidance is provided by the central
bank.
Jensen (2002) evaluates the desirability of NGDP targeting compared to
inflation targeting in the context of a linearized model with inflation and output
persistence. The policies are derived assuming the central bank has a quadratic
loss function which is not necessarily the same as society’s quadratic loss function.
The author finds that provided there are shocks that subject society to a monetary
policy trade-off, then NGDP targeting is preferred to inflation targeting.
Koenig (2012) analyzes the link between NGDP targeting and the Taylor
Rule/flexible inflation targeting. The author shows that the Taylor rule is a special
case of an NGDP target, but that NGDP targeting focuses more on stabilizing
long-term expectations. In addition, McCallum (2015) briefly points out that
NGDP growth targeting represents a special case of the optimal monetary policy
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from a timeless perspective while levels tend to call for stronger responses to drops
in output than the optimal policy would.
Using a medium-scale NK model, Gar´ın et al. (2015) find that NGDP
targeting leads to less welfare loss relative to a flexible price equilibrium than
a Taylor rule and inflation targeting. An output gap led to only slightly less
consumption loss, but only when the output gap is observed with little noise.
Sheedy (2014) demonstrates that in an overlapping generations model with
debt and incomplete markets a central bank following NGDP level targeting
will essentially ”complete the market” by causing the value of real debt to move
opposite real income. Brennan (2018a) looks at a NK model with heterogeneous
preferences and financial frictions. The key result is that the consumption
equivalent welfare loss under most NGDP targeting policies is less than most
conventional policies. Furthermore inflation targeting becomes preferable to all
of these policies when financial frictions are removed.
4.3 Model
The model we use for our analysis is a simple NK model, except steady state
gross inflation is assumed to no longer equal one. Firms resetting their prices may
partially index their future prices to trend or past inflation. The full derivation of
the model is available in the appendix. The model is a slightly altered version of
the one presented in Ascari and Ropele (2009).
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The model when log linearized takes the following form:
Yt = E
∗
t Yt+1 −
1
σc
(it − Etpit+1) (4.1)
∆t = κ1Yt + κ2st + κ3E
∗
t ∆t+1 + κ4E
∗
tGt+1 (4.2)
Gt = (1− ϕβΠ(1−θ)(−1))(1− σc)Yt + (1− θ)ϕβΠ(1−θ)(−1)E∗t ∆t+1 + ϕβΠ(1−θ)(−1)E∗tGt+1
(4.3)
st = ξ∆t + ϕΠ
−θ(−1)st−1 (4.4)
The endogenous variables are Y , pi, s, and G. The variable Y is output. The
variable pi is inflation. The variable s is the dispersion of prices. The variable G is
an auxiliary variable. ∆ is the quasi-difference of inflation equal to pit − ωpit−1,
where ω is the degree to which prices are indexed to trend inflation rather than
past inflation, and  is the overall degree of indexation of prices. E∗t represents
possibly subjective expectations at time t.
The first equation is the NK IS curve. The second equation is a more
generalized version of the Phillips curve. The third equation defines an auxiliary
variable equal to the present discounted value of future marginal revenue. The
fourth equation governs the evolution of price dispersion.
Here σc is the CRRA utility parameter for the consumer, the κi and ξ
variables are functions of θ, the elasticity of substitution across goods produced by
firms in the economy, ϕ, which is the probability of a firm being unable to reset its
price in a given period, β, the subjective discount factor, a, the elasticity of supply
with respect to labor, Π, gross trend inflation, , the degree of price indexation, and
both the CRRA utility parameter as well as the disutility of labor parameter, σc
and σn.
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We’ll focus our efforts on obtaining determinacy and E-Stability conditions
for an interest rate rule which targets contemporaneous NGDP growth:
it = α(pit + Yt − Yt−1), (4.5)
one that targets expected NGDP growth:
it = α(E
∗
t pit+1 + E
∗
t Yt+1 − Yt), (4.6)
one that targets current NGDP level:
it = α(pt + Yt), (4.7)
and one that targets the expected level of NGDP:
it = α(E
∗
t pt + E
∗
t Yt). (4.8)
Rt = (PtYt/P¯tYss)
P¯t = ΠP¯t−1
Pt = ΠtPt−1
P˜t = Pt/P¯t
In the level equations pt is the ”price gap”, the difference between the actual price
level and the central bank’s target price level. In addition we’ll also consider the
cases of these rules where the central bank has to nowcast endogenous variables.
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Stability and Determinacy
The system of questions can be written in the following form:
yt = AE
∗
t yt+1, (4.9)
with yt = (Yt, pit, st, Gt, Yt−1, pit−1)
′
under the contemporaneous NGDP
growth rule and Yt−1 is dropped for the expected NGDP growth and both NGDP
level rules, but pt is added for the level rules. The condition for determinacy is
that the number of eigenvalues of A less than one in absolute value must equal to
the number of ”free” variables, those which depend upon expectations of future
values of themselves. The free variables under both rules are Y , pi, and G. If the
number of eigenvalues inside the unit circle is exactly three then the steady state
is determinate, less than three then the steady state will be indeterminate. If the
number of eigenvalues inside the unit circle is more than three that will imply that
the steady state is explosive.
E-Stability
We can rewrite the system of equations in a slightly different form:
yt = ME
∗
t yt+1 +Nyt−1 (4.10)
where y = (Y, pi, s,G)
′
. Under least squares learning agents collect data
on the endogenous variables in the economy and try to estimate the equilibrium
relationship between them. This provides a more believable explanation of how
agents in the model form expectations. At time t, the agent believes that the
relationship between endogenous variables is:
95
yt = at−1 + bt−1yt−1. (4.11)
Here at and bt are the agent’s estimates of structural relationships of the
economy. Using this perceived law of motion (PLM) agents form expectations of
future variables:
E∗t yt+1 = at−1 + bt−1yt. (4.12)
We can substitute these expectations into (4.10) to obtain the actual law of
motion (ALM).
yt = (I −Mbt)−1Mat + (I −Mbt)−1Nyt−1 (4.13)
The coefficient matrices in the PLM are estimated using recursive least
squares. The algorithm used is:
ζt = ζt−1 + t−1R−1t et−1ς
′
t
Rt = Rt−1 + t−1(et−1e
′
t−1 −Rt−1),
where ζt = (at, bt)
′
, e
′
t = (1, y
′
t), and ςt = yt − ζ ′t−1et−1. We are concerned with
whether expectations will converge to the rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
which is in the form of the MSV solution:
yt = a+ byt−1. (4.14)
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We can map the coefficients in the ALM to the estimates being used in the
PLM.
T (a, b) = ((I −Mb)−1Ma, (I −Mb)−1N) (4.15)
By the E-stability principal, the algorithm will converge to the REE if the
REE is E-stable. E-stability is governed by the differential equation:
d
dτ
(a, b, c) = T (a, b, c)− (a, b, c). (4.16)
Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001) in models of the form expressed
above E-stability depends upon the eigenvalues of the following:
DTa(a¯, b¯) = (I −Mb¯)−1M (4.17)
DTb(b¯) = [(I −Mb¯)−1N ]′ ⊗ [(I −Mb¯)−1M ] (4.18)
With information set (y
′
t, 1) a necessary condition for E-stability is that the
eigenvalues of DTa and DTb have real parts less than 1. We choose to examine
this information set even though agents having knowledge of contemporaneous
endogenous variables is unrealistic because it can be seen as possibly one or two
steps down from rational expectations. Whereas when agents only know yt−1 we
step further away.
The E-stability condition changes when we assume that agents nowcast
endogenous variables. If that is the case then the system becomes:
yt = PE
∗
t yt +ME
∗
t yt+1 +Nyt−1 (4.19)
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The agents still forecast yt using (4.14). This means that the nowcast of yt is
equal to:
E∗t yt = at−1 + bt−1yt−1. (4.20)
Their forecast of yt+1 is now:
E∗t yt+1 = (1 + bt−1)at−1 + b
2
t−1yt−1. (4.21)
These lead to an ALM of:
yt = (P +M(1 + bt−1))at−1 + (N + Pbt−1 + b2t−1)yt−1. (4.22)
The map between the PLM and ALM is:
T (a, b) = ((P +M(1 + b))a,Mb2 + Pb+N). (4.23)
For E-stability of the REE we need the eigenvalues of the following matrices
evaluated at the REE to have real parts less than one:
DTa(a¯, b¯) = P +M(1 + b¯) (4.24)
DTb(b¯) = b¯
′ ⊗M + I ⊗Mb¯+ I ⊗ P (4.25)
Calibration
We calibrate our model to be in line with those presented in Gal´ı (2015,
Chapter 3). In our results section we will present four graphs for each interest rate
rule which show the determinacy, E-stability, and covariance stationarity properties
98
TABLE 18. Model Calibration
Parameter Value
a 0.75
β 0.99
θ 9
ϕ 0.75
σn 5
 {0, 0.5}
ω {0, 0.5}
σc {0.157, 1, 6.1}
for different combinations of the interest rate response parameter and the value of
gross trend inflation for different parameterizations of σc, , and ω. Each rule will
have the values of θ, β, ϕ, a, and σn in common across all graphs. The values of
these parameters are displayed in Table 1. We consider three values of σc which
correspond to values used in Woodford (1999), Clarida et al. (1999), and McCallum
and Nelson (1999b).
The reason we do not consider full indexation is because the model collapses
to the simple NK model with zero trend inflation.
4.4 Results
Our main question is for what combinations of Π and α do we see
determinacy and E-stability. We present our results for four different
parameterizations for each rule. We vary the CRRA utility parameter and the
degree of indexation to trend inflation to see what their effects are.
The values of α under consideration are from zero to seven. Larger ranges
were explored but did not change the results.
The values of Π under consideration depend on the value of indexation. As
can be seen in the appendix, there are values of Π for which there is no solution to
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the firm’s pricing problem because the expected discounted sums of future marginal
revenues and marginal costs will not converge. When  is equal to one half that
upper bound on Π is about 1.068, and when  is equal to zero that upper bound
on Π is closer to 1.033. These are quarterly rates, in our figures we will display the
annualized trend inflation rates which are 14% and 30% respectively.
We provide four figures for each rule. Panels a through c will always involve
the indexation parameter,  equal to 0.5, while in panel d it will be set to 0. In
panels a and d we set σc = 6.1, in panel b we set σc = 1, and in panel c we set it
equal to 0.157.
The results for the contemporaneous NGDP growth rules are presented
in figures 1 and 2. Common to all of these figures is a range of values for trend
inflation for which any α > 1 will result in both determinacy and E-stability.
For panels a through c, when there is partial indexation, the upper limit on
trend inflation for this region appears to be around 21% annually and for panel d
where there is no indexation it appears to occur a little above 10%. At values of
trend inflation below those thresholds, determinacy and E-stability being ensured
with α > 1 is in line with the results found in Brennan (2018b) for the zero
trend inflation steady state. Trend inflation above those limits lead to a loss of
determinacy and E-stability although not necessarily both are lost immediately.
The introduction of nowcasting mostly led to minor shifts in what parameter values
were E-stable or not.
The key takeaway here is that even up to fairly large values of annual trend
inflation a value of α greater than one will ensure determinacy and E-stability. This
result still holds when we assume a more realistic information set for the central
bank and require it to nowcast current inflation and output.
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The expected growth rule with full information is in figure 3. It appears to
inherit some of the determinacy and E-Stability properties it had under zero trend
inflation for values of trend inflation below the previously discussed limit. While
the general bounds appear roughly the same, either the upper or lower bound on
values of α which ensure determinacy and E-stability now change with the level
of trend inflation. Higher rates of trend inflation in fact lead to a wider range of
values of α which guarantee determinacy and E-stability. Once the upper limit is
reached there appears to be a flipping in the range of values of α which lead to
determinacy and E-stability. The nowcasting rule is presented in figure 4 does not
lead to many large changes beyond there being virtually no combinations of α and
Π that yield a determinate and E-stable equilibrium.
One very striking result here is that while in previous work setting σc equal to
one led to indeterminacy and E-instability for all values of α, when trend inflation
goes above 21% annually it appears that the REE is determinate and E-stable
for all values of α up to a certain level of trend inflation. Interestingly under the
nowcasting rule in that same range of values for Π, the values of α greater than one
lead to an E-unstable REE.
The contemporaneous nominal GDP level targets are presented in figures
5 and 6. Just as with previous figures up to a very high upper bound on trend
inflation the results for this interest rate rule found in previous work. Additionally
the nowcasting version of the interest rate rule does not change the E-stability
results much.
Finally in figure 7 we display results for the interest rate rule which targets
the expected level of NGDP. For all values of trend inflation under a certain
limit, there is a range of values for α which will produce both determinacy and
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E-stability. This range starts at zero and has an upper limit that is increasing with
σc. This is the same result that was found in the zero trend inflation case.
Across all figures some overall trends appear. First the indexation parameter
only appears to affect at what rate of trend inflation for which the firm’s
optimization problem has no solution. Second higher levels of trend inflation are
associated with the emergence of indeterminate and E-stable regions, implying the
possibility of learnable sunspots.
4.5 Conclusion
In summary, we have laid out the conditions for determinacy and E-stability
of the REE in a NK model with positive trend inflation and partial indexation of
prices under a variety of interest rate rules which target either the level or growth
of NGDP. Our results build on previous research in the areas of non-zero trend
inflation in NK models and the desirability of NGDP targets. For all interest rate
rules the determinacy and E-stability properties of the zero trend inflation case
mostly carry over up until some higher limit for trend inflation which is increasing
with the degree of inflation indexation among firms. We find that as was the case
under zero trend inflation the NGDP level target is determinate and E-stable for all
values of the interest rate response parameter, α, that were considered and have no
reason to believe that would change. There is now, however, the risk of explosive
solutions under all of the interest rate rules. Interest rate rules which targeted the
expected level or growth rate of NGDP faired poorly depending upon the value of
σc. This is particularly concerning when the central bank has to nowcast current
levels of real output for the expected NGDP growth interest rate rule.
Before seriously considering NGDP targets as a policy alternative there are
different future avenues of research that should be pursued. One of these is whether
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Determinacy and E-Stability Under NGDP Growth Rule
(a) (b)
(d)
FIGURE 17. In the above figures, the information set is assumed to include
contemporaneous endogenous variables. In figures, a through c price indexation
is set to 0.5 while in figure d it is set to 0. In figures a and d the CRRA utility
parameter is set to 6.1, in figure b it is set to 1, and in figure c it is set to 0.157.
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Determinacy and E-Stability Under Nowcasting NGDP Growth Rule
(a) (b)
(d)
FIGURE 18. In the above figures the information set is assumed to not include
contemporaneous endogenous variables. In figures a through c price indexation
is set to 0.5 while in figure d it is set to 0. In figures a and d the CRRA utility
parameter is set to 6.1, in figure b it is set to 1, and in figure c it is set to 0.157.
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Determinacy and E-Stability Under Expected NGDP Growth Rule
(a) (b)
(d)
FIGURE 19. In the above figures, the information set is assumed to include
contemporaneous endogenous variables. In figures a through c price indexation
is set to 0.5 while in figure d it is set to 0. In figures a and d the CRRA utility
parameter is set to 6.1, in figure b it is set to 1, and in figure c it is set to 0.157.
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Determinacy and E-Stability Under Nowcasting Expected NGDP
Growth Rule
(a) (b)
(d)
FIGURE 20. In the above figures the information set is assumed to not include
contemporaneous endogenous variables. In figures a through c price indexation
is set to 0.5 while in figure d it is set to 0. In figures a and d the CRRA utility
parameter is set to 6.1, in figure b it is set to 1, and in figure c it is set to 0.157.
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Determinacy and E-Stability Under NGDP Level Rule
(a) (b)
(d)
FIGURE 21. In the above figures, the information set is assumed to include
contemporaneous endogenous variables. In figures a through c price indexation
is set to 0.5 while in figure d it is set to 0. In figures a and d the CRRA utility
parameter is set to 6.1, in figure b it is set to 1, and in figure c it is set to 0.157.
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Determinacy and E-Stability Under Nowcasting NGDP Level Rule
(a) (b)
(d)
FIGURE 22. In the above figures the information set is assumed to not include
contemporaneous endogenous variables. In figures a through c price indexation
is set to 0.5 while in figure d it is set to 0. In figures a and d the CRRA utility
parameter is set to 6.1, in figure b it is set to 1, and in figure c it is set to 0.157.
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Determinacy and E-Stability Under Expected NGDP Level Rule
(a) (b)
(d)
FIGURE 23. In figures a through c price indexation is set to 0.5 while in figure d it
is set to 0. In figures a and d the CRRA utility parameter is set to 6.1, in figure b
it is set to 1, and in figure c it is set to 0.157.
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these results change if changes to interest rates are implemented with a lag. We
also may want to turn our eye towards distributional concerns of trend inflation
and NGDP targets. An important question to ask with regard to monetary models
with heterogeneous agents is who bears the costs of trend inflation in terms of
lost consumption and how the agents benefit or lose under NGDP targeting as
compared to conventional monetary policy such as a Taylor rule.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER II
In this appendix we describe the derivation of the model presented in Section
3 of the paper. There is a continuum of households i ∈ [0, 1]. Household i seeks
to maximize the discounted expected present value of utility which is a function of
real consumption, real money balances, and labor supply.
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−σt
1− σ +
1
1− γ
(
Mt
Pt
)1−γ
− χN
1+η
t
1 + η
]
(A.0.1)
Where Nt is hours worked, Mt/Pt is real money balances with Pt defined as:
Pt ≡
[∫ 1
0
p
1/(µt−1)
jt dj
]µt−1
(A.0.2)
Ct is a composite consumption good aggregated from the differentiated goods
that are produced by the j ∈ [0, 1] monopolistically competitive firms. In terms of
the goods produced by these firms Ct is:
Ct ≡
[∫ 1
0
c
1
µt
jt dj
]µt
. (A.0.3)
Where µt = µ + ξt is the markup over marginal cost that firms set prices at
when prices are flexible, with µ > 1 is the mean markup level and ξt is a covariance
stationary AR-1 process with an unconditional mean of zero. For any level of
Ct the household chooses they must choose the mixture of cjt that minimizes
expenditures.
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min
cjt
∫ 1
0
pjtcjtdj
s.t.
[∫ 1
0
c
1
µt
jt dj
]µt
≥ Ct
The first order condition is:
pjt − Λt
[∫ 1
0
c
1
µt
jt dj
]µt−1
c
1−µt
µt
jt = 0. (A.0.4)
Here Λt is the Lagrangian multiplier. The first order condition can be
rearranged to cjt = (pjt/Λt)
−θCt. Substituting this into (A.0.3) and solving for
Λt it can be shown that Λt = Pt, so we can conclude that the demand for the good
made by firm j is:
cjt =
(
pjt
Pt
)− µt
µt−1
Ct. (A.0.5)
The real household budget constraint is:
Ct +
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
=
Wt
Pt
Nt +
Mt−1
Pt
+ (1 + it−1)
Bt−1
Pt
+ Πt. (A.0.6)
Where Bt is nominal one period bond holdings, it is the nominal interest rate
paid on bonds, Wt is the nominal wage earned by the household, and Πt are the
real profits received from firms. In addition to the above flow budget constraint
households also follow a no ponzi-game condition:
lim
T→∞
βT−tEt
C−σT
C−σt
BT
PT
≥ 0. (A.0.7)
The first order conditions for the household’s optimization problem are:
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C−σt = β(1 + it)Et
(
Pt
Pt+1
)
C−σt+1 (A.0.8)(
Mt
Pt
)−γ
C−σt
=
it
1 + it
(A.0.9)
χNηt
C−σt
=
Wt
Pt
. (A.0.10)
The first equation is the household’s Euler equation of intertemporal choice.
The second equation determines the household’s money demand, it says that
the marginal rate of substitution between real money holdings and consumption
will equal the opportunity cost of holding money. The third equation determines
household labor supply, it says that the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption will equal the real wage.
Firms are monopolistically competitive and sell differentiated products. Firm
j has the following production function:
Yjt = ZtN
a
jt (A.0.11)
Here Zt is an aggregate productivity disturbance, E(Zt) = 1 and logZt =
ρ logZt−1 + t where  is an i.i.d. mean zero shock. The firm’s real marginal costs
can be written as:
ψjt =
Wt
PtZtN
a−1
jt
=
Wt
aPtYjt/Njt
. (A.0.12)
Firms are not always able to adjust their price each period. As in Calvo
(1983) only a fraction 1 − ω are able to update their prices, the rest of the firms do
not update their prices. When the firm is making this decision it does so choosing
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the price that maximizes the discounted stream of future real profits if it is unable
to change its price, therefore its pricing decision problem can be written as:
Et
∞∑
i=0
ωi∆t,t+i
[(
pjt
Pt+i
)
Yjt+i − ψjt+iYjt+i
]
(A.0.13)
Where ∆t+i is equal to β
i(Ct+i/Ct)
−σ. We can use the demand equation for
the good firm j produces to simplify this.
Et
∞∑
i=0
ωi∆t,t+i
[(
pjt
Pt+i
)− 1
µt−1 − ψjt+i
(
pjt
Pt+i
)− µt
µt−1
]
Ct+i (A.0.14)
The first order condition for the optimal price p∗t with some manipulation is:
Et
∞∑
i=0
ωi∆t,t+i
1
µt+i − 1Ct+i
(
p∗t
Pt+i
) −µt+i
µt+i−1 1
Pt+i
= Et
∞∑
i=0
ωi∆t,t+iCt+i
−µt+i
µt+i − 1ψjt+i
(
1
p∗t
)(
p∗t
Pt+i
) −µt+i
µt+i−1
.
(A.0.15)
We can use the first order condition to find the flexible price output level, or
potential GDP. Setting ω = 0 the optimal price becomes:
p∗t
Pt
= µtψjt. (A.0.16)
The price the firm sets is just equal to markup times the nominal marginal cost.
Furthermore since all firms face the same problem p∗t = Pt, which implies that
ψjt = 1/µt. Using the definition of real marginal costs from above we have that
Wt/Pt = aYjt/µNjt. Using this with the household’s intratemporal optimality
condition between leisure and consumption we get that:
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χNηt
C−σt
=
aYt
µtNt
. (A.0.17)
Because Ct = Yt in equilibrium and solving for Nt = (Yt/Zt)
1/a in the
production function we can obtain the flexible price level of output with the above
equation.
Y ft =
(
a
χµt
) a
1+a(σ−1)+η
Z
1+η
1+a(σ−1)+η
t (A.0.18)
From here we can define the ”natural” rate of output as the one where mark-
ups are equal to their mean value, so Y nt is the same as above but with µ in place
of µt.
Going back to the definition of Pt when prices are sticky it must be the
case that (1 − ω) of the pjt are equal to p∗. For those that can’t update their
price because they were chosen randomly the average of their prices must be Pt−1.
Therefore the price level satisfies:
P
1
µt−1
t = (1− ω)(p∗t )
1
µt−1 + ωP
1
µt−1
t−1 . (A.0.19)
The equilibrium is a collection {Ct, Nt,Mt, Pt, ψt, p∗t ,Wt, it}∞0 such that
(A.0.8)-(A.0.12),(A.0.15), (A.0.17) and (A.0.19) all hold.
To derive the New Keynesian Phillips Curve used in this paper, start with
equations (A.0.15) and (A.0.19), which represent the optimal pricing decision of a
firm and the evolution of the price level respectively. Define Qt ≡ p∗t/Pt. In steady
state Qt = Qt+1 = 1. If we divide the equation for the evolution of the price level
by Pt it becomes:
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1 = (1− ω)Q
1
µt−1
t + ω
(
Pt−1
Pt
) 1
µt−1
. (A.0.20)
Assuming that steady state inflation is zero Q
1
µt−1
t ≈ (1 + 1µ−1qt),
(Pt−1/Pt)
1
µt−1 ≈ (1 − 1
µ−1pit) where qt and pit are percentage deviations from steady
state, we can rewrite the equation that governs the evolution of the price level as a
linear relationship:
qt =
ω
1− ωpit. (A.0.21)
Next we return to the first order condition for the firm’s optimization problem
and factor out the mean value of µt+i:
µEt
∞∑
i=0
ωiβiψjt+iC
1−σ
t+i (1 +
1
µ
ξt+i)(1 +
1
µ− 1ξt+i)
1
p∗t
(
p∗t
Pt+i
) −µt+i
µt+i−1
=
Et
∞∑
i=0
ωiβiC1−σt+i (1 +
1
µ− 1ξt+i))
1
Pt+i
(
p∗t
Pt+i
) −µt+i
µt+i−1
.
We will use the following approximations of each variable in terms of
percentage deviations from steady state values, C1−σt+i ≈ C1−σ(1 + (1 − σ)ct+i),
(p∗t/Pt+i)
−µt+i/(µt+i−1) ≈ (1 + µ(µ − 1)−1(pt+i − pˆ∗t ), and ψjt+i ≈ ψ(1 + ψˆjt+i) where
C and ψ are the steady state values of consumption and real marginal costs.
Plugging these approximations into both sides, exploiting the fact that µψ =
1, and canceling out like terms obtains the following:
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Et
∞∑
i=0
ωiβi(ψˆjt+i − 1
µ(µ− 1)ξt+i +
µ
µ− 1(pt+i − pˆ
∗
t )− pˆ∗t ) =
Et
∞∑
i=0
ωiβi(
µ
µ− 1(pt+i − pˆ
∗
t )− pt+i −
1
µ− 1ξt+i). (A.0.22)
To proceed we will need to rewrite ψˆjt+i in terms of average marginal costs
ψt = (Wt/Pt)/(aCt/Nt) where we define Nt as the average labor supply.
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Njtdj =
∫ 1
0
(
Yjt
ZT
) 1
a
dj =
(
Yt
Zt
) 1
a
∫ 1
0
(
pjt
Pt
) −µt
a(µt−1)
dj (A.0.23)
When linearized the last term drops out because it becomes 1 − (µ/a(µ −
1))
∫
(pˆjt − pt)dj and when (A.0.2) is linearized we get that pt =
∫
pˆjtdj. So as a
result:
ψˆt = (wt − pt)− (yt − nt) = (wt − pt)− a− 1
a
yt − 1
a
zt. (A.0.24)
And using the equation for ψjt we can get its linear approximation as:
ψˆjt = (wt − pt)− a− 1
a
yjt − 1
a
zt. (A.0.25)
The difference between the two is:
ψˆjt − ψˆt = 1− a
a
(yjt − yt). (A.0.26)
Finally we can employ the demand relationship all firms face to write this in
terms of prices.
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ψˆjt = ψˆt − µ(a− 1)
a(µ− 1)(pˆjt − pt) (A.0.27)
Plugging the above relationship into equation (A.0.22), using the fact that
pˆjt = pˆ
∗
t , and after some manipulation we get:
pˆ∗t =
a(µ− 1)(1− ωβ)
a− µ
∞∑
i=0
βiωi(
a− µ
a(µ− 1)pt+i − ψˆt+i +
1− µ
µ(µ− 1)ξt+i). (A.0.28)
To simplify further recognize that if we pull out the current period variables
from the summation the summation is now equal to ωβEtpˆ
∗
t+1:
pˆ∗t = (1− ωβ)pt +
a(µ− 1)(1− ωβ)
µ− a ψt +
a(1− µ)(1− ωβ)
µ(a− µ) ξt + ωβEtpˆ
∗
t+1. (A.0.29)
We can substitute for pˆ∗t = qt + pt and use equation (A.0.21) to get:
ω
1− ωpit =
a(µ− 1)(1− ωβ)
µ− a ψt +
a(1− µ)(1− ωβ)
µ(a− µ) ξt +
ωβ
1− ωEtpit+1
pit = λ˜ψˆt +
λ˜
µ
ξt + βEtpit+1.
where
λ˜ =
(µ− 1)(1− ω)(1− ωβ)a
ω(µ− a)
Recall that ψt = (Wt/Pt)/(aYt/Nt), so ψˆt = wt − pt − (yt − nt). The linearized
form of equation (A.0.10) yields wt − pt = ηnt + σyt. Finally by the production
function nt = (1/a)(yt − zt). Using these we get:
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ψˆt =
η
a
(yt − z) + σyt − (yt − 1
a
(yt − zt))
=
σa+ η − a+ 1
a
yt − 1 + η
a
zt
=
σa+ η − a+ 1
a
[
yt − 1 + η
σa+ η − a+ 1zt
]
.
Now note that the linearization of the natural level of output is equal the
second term inside the square brackets.
ψˆt =
σa+ η − a+ 1
a
(yt − ynt ) (A.0.30)
So now the New Keynesian Phillips Curve assumes the form used in the main
body of the paper:
pit = λxt + βEtpit+1 + ut (A.0.31)
λ =
σa+ η − a+ 1
a
λ˜. (A.0.32)
where xt ≡ yt − ynt , and ut = λ˜ξt/µ.
The next step of deriving the linearized model is to obtain the New Keynesian
IS equation. We start by linearizing the household Euler equation:
yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1). (A.0.33)
If we subtract ynt and Ety
n
t+1 from both sides we get:
xt = Etxt+1 − φ(it − Etpit+1) + gt. (A.0.34)
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where gt = Ety
n
t+1 − ynt .
The final step is to recognize that the linearized version of (A.0.9) is:
mt − pt = σ
γ
yt − 1
issγ
iˆt. (A.0.35)
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(a) Impulse response function for traditional policies.
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(b) Impulse response function for NGDP based policies.
FIGURE 24. Impulse Response Functions for Yt, pit, i
d
t , bt, and ωt to leisure shocks.
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(a) Impulse response function for traditional policies.
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(b) Impulse response function for NGDP based policies.
FIGURE 25. Impulse Response Functions for Yt, pit, i
d
t , bt, and ωt to wage markup
shocks.
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(b) Impulse response function for NGDP based policies.
FIGURE 26. Impulse Response Functions for Yt, pit, i
d
t , bt, and ωt to public
spending shocks.
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(a) Impulse response function for traditional policies.
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(b) Impulse response function for NGDP based policies.
FIGURE 27. Impulse Response Functions for Yt, pit, i
d
t , bt, and ωt to borrower
marginal utility shocks.
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(a) Impulse response function for traditional policies.
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(b) Impulse response function for NGDP based policies.
FIGURE 28. Impulse Response Functions for Yt, pit, i
d
t , bt, and ωt to saver marginal
utility shocks.
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This derivation primarily follows the ones that can be found in Ascari and
Ropele (2009) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014). Assume that the model is the same
as the one found in the Chapter 2 appendix except steady state inflation is non-
zero and firms are able index prices to either past or trend inflation. This means
that a firm that the price of a firm at period t+ i that reset its price in period t is:
Pt|t+i = P ∗t Ωt|t+i−1 (C.0.1)
Ωt|t+i−1 =
(
Pt+i−1
Pt−1
)ω
Π(1−ω). (C.0.2)
Here Π is gross trend inflation,  is the degree of indexation, and ω determines
the relative weight between past inflation and trend inflation.
The firms’ optimization problem is given by:
max
Pjt
∞∑
i=0
E∗t (βϕ)
iΛt|t+i(
PjtΩt|t+i−1
Pt+i
Yt|t+i − Wt+i
Pt+i
Y
1/a
t|t+i) (C.0.3)
s.t.Yt|t+i =
(
Pt|t+i
Pt+i
)−θ
Yt+i (C.0.4)
At this point we need to be sure that the value of trend inflation is low
enough such that the above summations converge in the deterministic steady state.
Ascari and Ropele (2009) shows that this requires that the following holds:
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Π < min{
(
1
ϕ
) 1
(θ−1)(1−)
,
(
1
βϕ
) 1
θ(1−)
} (C.0.5)
The first order condition to the firm’s optimization problem can be written as:
(
P ∗t
Pt
)1+ 1−a
a
=
theta
a(θ − 1)
Ft
Gt
(C.0.6)
Ft =
∞∑
i=0
E∗t (βϕ)
iΛt|t+i
Wt+i
Pt+i
Y
1/a
t+i
(
Ωt|t+i−1
Πt|t+i
)−θ
a
(C.0.7)
Gt =
∞∑
i=0
E∗t (βϕ)
iΛt|t+i
(
Ωt|t+i−1
Πt|t+i
)1−θ
Yt+i. (C.0.8)
Additionally, the price level is evolving according to:
Pt[ϕ(Pt−1Ωt−1|t−1)1−θ + (1− ϕ)(P ∗t )1−θ]1/(1−θ) (C.0.9)
Finally while under zero trend inflation the first order approximation to price
dispersion was just its stead state value, now it must be tracked:
st = (1− ϕ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−θ
+ ϕ
(
Πt
Ωt−1|t−1
)θ
st−1. (C.0.10)
Where st ≡
∫ 1
0
(Pi,t/Pt)
−θdi.
You can then log linearize these equations and substitute (C.0.9) into the
other two to arrive at the log linearized equations for the Phillips Curve and the
evolution of price dispersion presented in Chapter 4. The coefficients in those
equations are:
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κ1 = −
Π(θ+1)(−(+1))
(
Πθ+1 − ϕΠθ+)
aϕ(a(θ − 1)− θ)
(
Πθ+1
(
a2σc− (C.0.11)
a2 + ϕβθΠ(− 1) + σn(ϕβθΠ(− 1) + a) + a
)− a2ϕβ (σc − 1) Πθ+) (C.0.12)
κ2 =
σnΠ
−θ− (ϕΠθ+ − Πθ+1) (ϕβθΠ(− 1) + a)
ϕ(a(−θ) + a+ θ) (C.0.13)
κ3 = −
βΠ(θ+1)(−(+1))
(−a2(θ − 1)Πθ+θ++1 + aϕθΠ2(θ+) − θ2(− 1)Πθ+2 (Πθ+1 − ϕΠθ+))
a(a(θ − 1)− θ)
(C.0.14)
κ4 = −
βΠ(θ−1)(−1)
(
aΠθ−θ+−1 + θΠ(− 1)) (ϕΠθ−θ+−1 − 1)
a(θ − 1)− θ (C.0.15)
ξ =
ϕθ (pi − pi) piθ+θ(−)−1
ϕΠθ−θ+−1 − 1 (C.0.16)
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